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Executive Summary: 
Key Messages and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, renewable energy sources (RES) have attracted heightened interest 
for a number of different reasons. RES promise strategic improvements in the security of 
supply, reduce the long-term price volatility to which the EU is subjected as a price-taker for 
fossil fuels and could offer an enhanced competitive edge for the EU RES technology industry. 
Renewables reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They also facilitate 
improvement in the economic and social prospects of rural and isolated regions in industrialised 
countries and provide better access for meeting basic energy needs in developing countries. The 
cumulative effect of all these benefits makes a robust case for renewables support. The EU aims 
at having renewable sources provide the power for 21% of the electricity generated in its 25 
member states by 2010. This target has been formulated in the EU Renewables Directive 
(2001/77/EC), which sets out differentiated targets for each member state and framework 
conditions for market support for renewable generation. The Renewables Directive stipulates 
that member states have to provide better access for renewable energy generators to electricity 
transmission and distribution networks, as well as streamline and expedite authorisation 
procedures.  
This report analyses the state of play of EU renewables policy and reviews the support 
mechanisms to achieve the 2010 target. It develops a medium- to long-term strategy and 
provides a blueprint for a viable support framework for beyond 2010 (in chapter 6).  
Key Messages 
1.  Harmonisation of divergent national support schemes among EU member states is a policy 
directly related to the forthcoming increase in volumes of renewable electricity (RES-E) in 
the EU. A greater percentage of RES-E – coupled with different member-state stimulation 
policies – could result in distortions in Europe’s renewable electricity markets, essentially 
raising barriers to trade and affecting competition. On the other hand, policy harmonisation 
is expected to increase the stability of the electricity grid and allow for economies of scale 
through the creation of liquid and efficient markets. Although difficult to implement at 
present – mainly owing to the fact that in many member states RES-E policies have only 
recently been initiated – in the medium term harmonisation is an essential component of the 
drive towards completion of the internal electricity market. It will have to be based on either 
feed-in tariffs (FIT) or feed-in premiums (FIP) as a next step, or a renewables portfolio 
standard (RPS), or a hybrid system of RPS/FIP or RPS/FIT.  
2.  In the short run, coordination of total support levels per MWh for each RES-E technology is 
warranted, with due allowance for differences in renewable resources. The compilation of 
comprehensive standardised data on support levels by technology for each member state is a 
prerequisite to that effect. These have to be compiled by the member states, based on 
criteria (to be issued by the European Commission) for generating the information needed 
for the coordination of RES-E support. ‘Support’ not only encompasses direct subsidies but 
also the price consequences of quota systems. It is possible that quota systems will lead to 
higher electricity prices, by either direct higher production costs or by paying fines for not 
reaching the quota. ii | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
3.  Targets can give investment signals for specific periods and thus enhance regulatory 
stability and consistency. Future RES-E targets (i.e. beyond 2010) should be set in such a 
manner that they are reasonably ambitious without undermining competitiveness. The 
setting of long-term targets is also needed to provide more transparency to stakeholders on 
market framework conditions during (most of) the expected lifetime of RES-E projects 
coming on-stream in the next few years. On the one hand, targets should be higher than the 
RES-E volume to be realised in their absence. On the other, targets should not be overly 
ambitious, i.e. they should not result in excessive additional costs that impact the 
competitiveness of electricity-intensive economic activities and may lead to carbon leakage. 
Prudent analysis should precede the setting of RES-E targets, which reconcile in a balanced 
way the three pillars of energy policy and the Lisbon Agenda: i) to realise energy prices in 
the internal market that are competitive in a global perspective; ii) to enhance long-term 
energy security; and iii) to mitigate the environmental impact, including climate change, of 
energy production and use. Another approach to long-term RES-E targets as a means of 
strengthening European industry could be the support of the competitive ‘edge’ of RES-E 
technologies in the global market. The focus would be on reducing unit production costs, 
thus investing more in R&D for generation, transmission and distribution, promoting 
innovation, efficacy and efficiency in a cost-effective manner.  
4.  The Renewables Directive envisages a role for renewable energy guarantees-of-origin (RE-
GOs) to facilitate trade in renewable electricity and to increase transparency for the 
consumer’s choice. To be able to achieve these objectives, it is imperative to implement 
harmonised (fully compatible), reliable and accurate RE-GO systems covering renewable 
electricity on a comprehensive basis. To that effect, cross-border externalities related to 
trade in renewable electricity guarantees and consumer protection are compelling 
arguments. Furthermore, such RE-GO systems are indispensable for the facilitation of a 
range of other commercial and official applications, not the least of which is reliable and 
accurate generation-attribute disclosure. The introduction of harmonised, dependable and 
accurate RE-GO systems is a key stepping stone towards a comprehensive guarantee-of-
origin system. This, in turn, will help to prevent a duplication of effort in electricity 
certification for other policy purposes, such as (reliable) generation attribute disclosure and 
certification of electricity from efficient heat and power plants. Clear guidance by the 
European Commission is warranted to define the details of harmonised RE-GO systems. 
5.  A number of network improvements will be necessary in order to facilitate the greater 
uptake of RES-E in the European grid. These actions need to have an ongoing character. 
Grid extension planning in parallel with decisions to construct new capacity will be 
necessary all along the process. Continuous coordination and sharing of information among 
regulators and transmission system operators (TSOs) are also essential. A number of 
technical issues such as harmonisation of member-state grid access codes and standards for 
network equipment must be considered to improve RES-E market penetration in a cost-
effective manner. After an initial period, and contingent upon improvements in renewable 
electricity competitiveness vis-à-vis conventional fuels, priority dispatch for RES-E could 
be re-examined.  
Recommendations 
1.  Member states should be encouraged to implement adjustments to their respective schemes 
for RES-E promotion based on the forthcoming review of ‘best practice’ for each of the 
different main approaches by the European Commission. Moreover, the bottom-up cross-
border joining of similar national support systems would be a measure for the integration 
and reduction of (transaction) costs. MARKET STIMULATION OF RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY | iii 
 
2.  Market support frameworks that include periodic monitoring and appraisal features will 
ensure the eventual phasing-out of regulatory market support for currently supported RES-E 
technologies. Accordingly, associated additional costs for electricity end-users should be 
phased out as well. Reasonable, normative benchmark figures should be set for the future 
evolution of unit electricity costs and market penetration of supported RES-E technologies 
in close coordination with the stakeholder associations concerned. Performance with respect 
to establishing benchmarks in future milestone years should have transparent, pre-set 
consequences for subsequent regulatory support levels. The phasing-out of market support 
is only possible if originally high-cost RES-E can eventually compete with the marginal 
production costs of the alternative conventional production. 
3.  The Commission should further clarify the nature of RES-E targets and set these out in an 
unambiguous way without compromising the integrity of RE-GOs. The targets should be 
clearly interpreted as either production targets or as consumption targets as a percentage of 
gross consumption. If, as recommended, the Commission opts for the production-target 
interpretation, member states should be allowed to merge their respective targets along with 
having the responsibility of jointly meeting the aggregate target. In the case of an unjustified 
failure to meet the aggregate target, each member state under the ‘target bubble’ should be 
held responsible for (under)compliance with respect to its own national target. The 
production-target interpretation is fully compatible with the cross-border trade of RE-GOs. 
If the Commission alternatively opts for consumption targets, compliance should be based 
exclusively on the underlying renewable energy of eligible RE-GOs redeemed during a 
target year (automatically including RE-GOs imported from other member states). In so 
doing, the integrity of the RE-GOs market is preserved, the deadweight administrative costs 
of obtaining desired target attributes from exporting member states are avoided and the 
consistency principle (implying that the information on a certain phenomenon from various 
official sources is consistent– e.g. national renewable-electricity consumption) is respected.  
4.  Authorisation procedures in the member states should be streamlined and expedited. This 
includes making licensing and complaint procedures more efficient and establishing one-
stop authorisation agencies to facilitate RES-E project developers. The public’s engagement 
should be promoted and developed in such a manner that adds value, credibility and 
expediency to an open consultation process. Decisions regarding authorisation of RES-E 
project applications should be reached within pre-defined timeframes and justified in 
accordance with transparent criteria. In the authorisation procedures, there should be a clear 
assignment of competences among central, regional and municipal authorities. 
5.  More detailed – in particular trans-boundary – studies should be conducted on the network 
effects of grid integration and requirements for network reinforcement to accommodate the 
integration of planned volumes of RES-E. Accordingly, appropriate forward planning of 
network expansion and reinforcement will have to be pursued. A certain, limited amount of 
public funding could be allocated to the integration of renewable electricity into networks, 
with special attention paid to research, development and demonstration (RD&D) on the 
storage of generated capacity and forecasting (for wind energy in particular). Harmonisation 
of member-state grid access codes and standards for network and renewable power-plant 
equipment are short-term actions that will improve cost-efficiency through economies of 
scale and coordination across borders. Special attention should also be given to grid 
connection charges – possibly including locational price signals, which could steer RES-E 
investor decisions into more network-optimal directions (it should be noted that some 
countries do not have these signals). 
6.  The two policy instruments – the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and support for RES-E 
production – pursue different objectives. One aims at increasing the share of renewables iv | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
(i.e. supply) in view of multiple sustainable development objectives, while the other aims at 
reducing GHG emissions (i.e. supply and demand measures) solely in view of meeting 
climate change objectives. There is, however, an important interaction between the two 
instruments and their two aims. The amount of emissions from the covered installation will 
correspond exactly to the amount of allowances allocated plus the amount of certified 
emission reductions and emission reduction units allowed into the ETS market through the 
Linking Directive (2004/101/EC). This means that additional RES-E production no longer 
has a CO2 effect as the cap for the power sector remains unchanged, irrespective of the level 
of renewable power production targets. If, however, a member state cannot expect any CO2 
benefits from its renewables policy, this could eventually weaken the political support for 
such policy if the implementation burden among member states is perceived as unequal. 
7.  Renewable electricity stimulation may interact significantly with other Community 
environmental policies. For example, in Austria and Italy – where hydro power is the most 
important source available for the generation of renewable electricity – implementation of 
the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) is limiting the use of available hydro power 
potential considerably. This raises the issue of coherence and better coordination among 
Community initiatives. 
8.  The international dimension of RES policy should also be explored through the integration 
of non-EU countries (such as those in the EEA, EU candidates and European 
Neighbourhood Policy countries) in the EU renewables policy framework. Any such 
country applying to join this framework would have to transpose the Renewables Directive 
into its national legislation in close association with the European Commission. This would 
entail inter alia the adoption of credible RES targets. Consequently, these countries should 
be allowed to transfer RE-GOs to EU member states, which could generate additional 
revenue and facilitate arrangements for financing new RES-E projects in these countries. 
Potential benefits for the EU relate to the enhanced security of energy supply and the spread 
of sustainable development in neighbouring countries. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
he last decade has seen heightened interest in renewable energy sources (RES) for a 
number of different reasons. RES promise strategic improvements in the security of 
supply as the EU will increasingly have to source fossil fuels in geopolitically unstable 
countries, but they are likely to pose challenges for short-term security of supply or systems 
security. Other benefits associated with renewables are an enhanced competitive edge for the 
EU in the dawning renewable electricity (RES-E) technology industry and a reduction in the 
long-term price-volatility risk that the EU has as a price-taker for fossil fuels. Renewable 
energies mitigate regional and local pollution, as well as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Long-term climate change policy will rely on zero carbon technologies or carbon capture and 
storage or both. Finally, renewables also provide improvements in the economic and social 
prospects for rural and isolated regions in industrialised countries and more opportunities to 
meet basic energy needs in developing countries. Although individually each benefit on its own 
would not necessarily be sufficient to make a persuasive argument in support of renewables, 
their cumulative effect makes a robust one. This case becomes even stronger if one adds the 
EU’s international obligations on sustainable development (as discussed in the Johannesburg 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 and the Bonn Action Plan in 2004), the 
Kyoto Protocol (and the yet to be established post-2012 regime when the Protocol expires in 
2012) and the International Action Plan on renewables.  
As a result, the EU aims at having renewable sources provide 21% of the electricity generated in 
its 25 member states by 2010. This target has been formulated in the EU Renewables Directive 
(2001/77/EC), which has set differentiated targets for each member state and framework 
conditions for market support for renewable generation. In addition, the Renewables Directive 
stipulates that member states have to provide better access for renewable energy generators to 
electricity distribution networks, including the streamlining and expediting of authorisation 
procedures.  
Under the Renewables Directive, member states are free to choose their preferred support 
mechanism and will be allowed to continue to do so for a transition period of at least seven 
years after a new EU-wide regulatory framework is adopted. A proposal for such a framework 
may be forthcoming, but it is not expected in the context of the forthcoming 2005 European 
Commission evaluation report.  
Although this ‘decentralised’ approach towards renewables support appears to be justified as 
long as volumes are limited – hence there are few cross-border effects (e.g. on grids) and a 
minimal impact on the internal energy market – there are concerns that national solutions may 
create trade barriers, distort competition in the internal market and forego efficiency gains from, 
for example, economies of scale. Further (largely unrelated) concerns are the existing barriers to 
renewables, which may inhibit further penetration. These include administrative and grid 
barriers but also subsidies to competing fuels. A first step must be to create a level playing field 
for renewables. As volumes rise, questions are increasingly raised about the costs and who 
should bear them, leading to more voices calling for cost-effectiveness. Finally, a successful EU 
renewables policy will ultimately need to be embedded in and consistent with other EU policies 
governing the internal energy market, competitiveness, the environment, technology, security of 
supply, agriculture and social structures. Since a substantial number of the public benefits 
pursued by policies supporting renewables are national or local (e.g. pollution reduction and 
security of supply), national peculiarities should be respected and duly taken into account when 
addressing potential issues related to trade barriers and the distortion of competition. 
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This report analyses the state of play of the EU’s renewables policy. It further attempts to 
develop a longer-term strategy against the background of the EU Treaty and other EU policy 
goals for achieving the short-term objectives of the 2010 target, and to also provide a viable 
framework for beyond 2010 and meeting potentially more challenging objectives.  
Following this brief introduction, the main report is structured in five chapters. Chapter 2 
assesses the potential benefits of renewable energy and how they can be met in the most cost-
effective way. Chapter 3 surveys RES-E market support mechanisms in terms of their efficiency 
and efficacy in meeting set targets. Chapter 4 covers the issues of disclosure and verification of 
electricity from renewable sources and guarantees of origin for renewable electricity (RE-GOs). 
Chapter 5 identifies the principal barriers to renewables and briefly sketches their impact. 
Chapter 6 returns to the initial question of what degree of coordination or harmonisation would 
be needed to achieve the key objectives in a cost-effective way that is consistent with the EU 
Treaty and other EU policies. Accordingly, chapter 6 identifies a series of consecutive steps 
towards a long-term strategy for an effective and efficient EU renewables policy. The main 
findings of the report are also contained in the preceding Executive Summary, including key 
messages and recommendations.  
The report has two annexes. Annex A outlines the relative support given by EU legislation to 
co-generation of heat and power (CHP) and distributed generation and their relation to RES-E. 
Annex B provides a list of members of the Task Force and invited guests and speakers.  
 | 3 
Chapter 2 
The EU’s Renewable Electricity Policy:  
Objectives and Instruments 
2.1 Introduction 
The case for stimulating the market deployment of renewable energy in general and renewables-
based electricity in particular is broadly embraced. Member states have introduced a variety of 
distinct instruments to support the market uptake of renewable electricity. This chapter 
introduces four main support mechanisms and reviews stakeholder positions regarding the 
promotion of renewables. 
Section 2.2 presents the key arguments underscoring the case for policy support to promote the 
market uptake of renewable electricity. Recent developments in EU legislation affecting market 
stimulation of renewable electricity are outlined in section 2.3. Section 2.4 introduces the four 
main support mechanisms. An analysis of stakeholder positions on the design of market support 
for renewable electricity is provided in section 2.5.  
2.2  The potential merits of electricity from renewable sources 
Briefly stated, enhancing the role of renewables in the EU electricity mix in a certain target year 
(e.g. 2020) with respect to a certain base year (e.g. 1997, the base year of the Renewables 
Directive, 2001/77/EC) has the following benefits: 
•  Improved security of energy supply. In meeting their rising needs for the depletable 
resources of natural gas and oil, the world’s largest economies (the EU, the US, China, 
Japan and India) will increasingly have to source supply in geopolitical regions that are 
highly unstable. The problem is compounded for both these economies and other fossil-fuel 
importers in that they are bound to meet their requirements in fierce competition with one 
another. Increasing the share of renewables in the EU electricity mix will help to reduce the 
dependence on imported fossil fuels from volatile geopolitical regions. On the other hand, 
renewable energy sources (RES) alone cannot fully secure energy supply – especially if we 
consider the present and future share of non-baseload renewables such as wind power and 
solar PV in electricity generation.
1 Hence, careful planning is required so that the increased 
share of non-baseload renewables, which provides indigenous energy and reduces import 
dependence, will not negatively affect the operation of the electricity system. 
•  Improved long-term electricity price and price volatility. The problem of security of supply 
is reflected in the fossil-fuel price risk, notably for natural gas and oil. As distinct from 
generating portfolios in which gas-based electricity generation is assuming an increasingly 
dominant role, portfolios with a substantially rising share of renewable electricity (RES-E) 
will see their long-term portfolio price risk fall. Increasing the share of renewables in the 
EU electricity mix in a cost-effective way will help in the long run to reduce: 
-  the (average EU) portfolio (electricity) price at the same year-to-year portfolio (price) 
risk; or  
-  the portfolio risk at the same portfolio price; or 
-  the portfolio price and year-to-year portfolio price risk. 
                                                           
1 Wind power capacity is poised to increase by 7.4% per year by 2010, a 265% rise vis-à-vis 2003 
capacity (for wind power and solar PV potentials); see CEER (2004), pp. 36-37. 4 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
In other words, it will help move the EU’s electricity mix closer to the efficient frontier of 
electricity mixes (Awerbuch & Berger, 2003). Enhancing the role of RES-E is therefore 
consistent with the Lisbon Agenda in making the EU economy more competitive and 
resilient, provided this is done in a cost-effective way.  
It should be noted that the natural volatility of wind power supply together with a rising 
share of wind power may lead to higher day-to-day volatility in electricity prices. A recent 
DENA study (2005) indicated that an increase in the share of wind power in electricity 
supply results in a lower capacity credit for wind power capacity. DENA puts the capacity 
credit of German wind power in 2003 at a mere 6-8% with a 4.2% energy penetration rate 
(14.5 GW of wind power installed) and even projects it to fall to 5-6% with an estimated 
13.5% penetration rate (36 GW of wind power installed by 2015). 
•  Enhanced competitive edge for the EU in the dawning RES-E technology industries. The 
high impact of local pollutants as well as the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) will 
challenge government authorities in the EU and elsewhere to impose increasingly strict 
pollutant emissions constraints. As a result of accounting for environmental externalities 
and supply constraints regarding natural gas, a long-term trend towards improved 
competitiveness of lower-cost RES-E appears in the offing. Consequently, a sustained 
growth in the demand for related RES-E technology equipment is anticipated. But with 
large hydro being a major exception, RES-E is by and large not yet fully commercially 
mature in the centralised electricity markets. This is partly owing to the fact that the external 
costs of electricity generation are not yet accounted for. Hence, under current technology 
and market conditions, RES-E will not take off to a substantial extent without significant 
government intervention in that direction. Therefore, a strong long-term policy commitment 
in the EU to stimulate the production and market uptake of renewable electricity will 
stimulate European RES-E technology providers to consolidate and even strengthen their 
first-mover competitive edge in the global market. Learning-curve analyses suggest that 
learning rates for renewables such as wind power and solar PV are on the order of 10-20%. 
This would imply that their costs go down by 10-20% for each doubling of cumulative 
market deployment. Typically, for non-renewable generating technologies these rates are 
much lower.  
•  Mitigation of GHG emissions by the EU power sector. The diplomacy of the EU has 
assumed a pioneering role in enabling the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force and the EU has 
a strong interest in establishing a global post-2012 regime when the Protocol expires. 
Increasing the share of renewables in the EU electricity mix will help the EU to strengthen 
the credibility of its aspired model role in achieving a more sustainable world. For example, 
the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) expects wind energy alone to meet 30% of 
the EU’s total GHG reduction obligation by 2010 (EWEA, 2003). Yet, except for some 
regions that are well-endowed with low-cost renewable resources, renewables-based power 
generation remains a rather expensive GHG reduction option in the short and medium term.  
•  Mitigation of regional and local pollutant emissions. Increasing the share of electricity from 
renewable sources in the electricity mix, notably from non-biomass ones, at the expense of 
electricity from fossil fuels will reduce regional and local pollutant emissions. To date, in 
the EU non-market-based emission control regulation prevails, as far as SO2, NOx and other 
local pollutants are concerned. The adverse impact of local pollutants (e.g. on public health 
and biodiversity) raises serious concerns among EU policy-makers. Renewable electricity, 
especially if it is not based on biomass, has low impact characteristics. Therefore, tightening 
future emissions control and introducing more market-based control instruments will 
favourably affect the prospective economics of electricity from renewable sources. MARKET STIMULATION OF RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY | 5 
 
•  Improved economic and social prospects for rural and isolated regions. Electricity supply 
in rural and isolated regions might be improved cost-effectively by on-grid and distributed 
generation options based on renewables. These options imply deployment of more local 
labour, including labour in the supplying industry. Obviously, the best solutions are very 
site-specific, precluding more detailed general statements. Furthermore, the case for a 
sector-specific policy at the EU or national level – such as renewables-based electricity 
stimulation – to promote ‘social coherence’ seems a rather weak one. Improvement of 
regions with a weak economy can be much better achieved by way of integrated regional 
policies (Jansen, 2003b). Nonetheless, within the framework of such ‘structural policies’ 
investment in renewables-based electricity generation facilities can play a certain role.  
•  Improved opportunities to meet the basic energy needs of the rural poor in the developing 
world. More or less the same considerations apply to this point as the previous one.  
The benefits listed above are not (or only partially) captured by the net value added 
fetched by operators in the value chain of renewables-based electricity. Moreover, 
generators and suppliers of electricity from sources other than renewables – notably fossil fuels 
and nuclear energy – have enjoyed and are still enjoying net positive public-sector 
interventions.
2 These take the form of targeted research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) programmes with public support, direct production or financing subsidies (or both), or 
(partial) waivers for compensation tax payment of damages caused to the environment. To the 
extent that this situation prevails, there is a clear case for public intervention in support of 
RD&D and market deployment of renewables-based electricity.
3   
Renewables stimulation should be pursued as a separate policy and not be linked to 
climate change policy. In fact, if RES-E stimulation was considered merely as a component of 
climate change policy then the implementation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme would 
obviate the need for specific RES-E market stimulation schemes altogether (Sijm, 2005). The 
broad range of merits associated with RES-E justifies measured, dedicated public support for 
RES-E penetration in the electricity market (also see chapter 6).  
Several eminent international forums have embraced renewables stimulation as a high priority 
policy. For example, the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development linked 
deployment of renewable energy to the supply access of the poor for meeting their basic energy 
needs, which resulted in the Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition.
4 During the 2004 
World Renewable Energy Conference in Bonn, the Bonn Action Plan was adopted with an 
impressive list of actions to which governments and international bodies committed themselves. 
The European Union was urged during this conference by renewable energy organisations and 
some member states to set a renewable energy target of 20% in 2020, which – if adopted – 
would translate into quite an ambitious renewable electricity target of about 40%. The European 
Council of 22 and 23 March 2005 concluded that a 15-30% CO2 reduction by the developed 
countries in 2020 (as compared with 1990) in the framework of a post-2012 United Nations-
based arrangement should be considered, which could further enhance the role of renewables.  
 
 
                                                           
2 A paucity of unbiased information exists on this issue. According to the EEA, more than 80% of recent 
energy subsidies paid in the EU went to fossil fuels and nuclear power (EEA, 2004). On the other hand, 
subject to confirmation, the most recent information indicates that this share is decreasing.  
3 The reduction of net support for generation and use of electricity from other sources should also be part 
of the level-playing-field equation. The EREC position paper (Kjaer & Schäfer, 2005) exposes public 
interventions in favour of electricity from sources other than renewables and provides further references. 
4 For more information, see the europa website (http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/env/ctf/library).  6 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
Moreover, the UK government put the promotion of renewable energy sources prominently on 
the agenda during the G-8 conference in Gleneagles this past summer and indeed the G-8 
adopted a (non-committal) resolution in favour of the world-wide promotion of renewables. 
2.3  Current EU legislation  
2.3.1 Recent  legislation on support for RES-E 
5  
The internal electricity market 
Overall competitiveness is being promoted through liberalisation of the EU electricity and gas 
markets as well as by separation of energy production, transportation and distribution activities. 
For fostering competitiveness of the EU economy and concomitant income and value-added 
creation, the promotion of one internal market at the Community level is considered essential. 
Cross-border trade on level-playing-field terms would foster competition. The Electricity 
Market Directive (2003/54/EC) establishes common rules for the generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply of electricity within the internal market in electricity.  
RES-E support 
In 2001 the EU adopted its Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable 
sources (European Council, 2001). The Renewables Directive (2001/77/EC) sets out to create a 
framework that will facilitate, in the medium term, a significant increase in renewables-based 
electricity within the EU. It constitutes an important milestone in shaping the regulatory 
framework for RES-E generation in the EU. The main support features of the Renewables 
Directive are outlined below. 
The Renewables Directive sets targets for the share of RES-E in total electricity consumption at 
EU and member-state levels. The overall share of renewable energy sources in total primary 
energy supply in the EU-15 is to reach 12% in 2010, with a renewable energy share in 
electricity consumption of 22% in that same year. The latter objective is broken down into 
differentiated percentages for each member state. For the 10 countries that entered the 
Community in May 2004, similar RES-E targets have been negotiated and published in the 
Accession Treaty. Given reference projections for total electricity demand, the implied target for 
the EU-25 by 2010 is 21%. 
The Renewables Directive defines the targets as consumption targets, i.e. “national indicative 
targets for future consumption [as] a percentage of gross electricity consumption of electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources in terms of a percentage of electricity consumption” 
(European Commission, 2001, Art 3.2). The Annex, however, refers to “national indicative 
targets for the contribution of electricity produced from renewable energy sources to gross 
electricity consumption”. Hence, the denominator (gross electricity consumption) is clear, 
whereas the nominator could be interpreted as either production or consumption of RES-E.
6 
                                                           
5 In conjunction with RES-E legislation, a short account on legislation governing co-generation of heat 
and power (CHP) can be found in Annex A. 
6 The third note to the table in this Annex states that “The percentage contributions...are based on the 
national production of RES-E divided by the gross national electricity consumption. In the case of 
internal trade of RES-E (with recognised certification or origin registered) the calculation of these 
percentages will influence 2010 figures by Member State but not the Community total”. This statement 
does not help to provide full market transparency on the role of renewable electricity (generation 
attribute) trade in target compliance. Nor does the Commission’s Communication (COM(2004) 366 final) 
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The Renewables Directive provides a broad definition of renewable energy. It includes 
hydropower (large and small), biomass (solids, biofuels, landfill gas, sewage-treatment plant gas 
and biogas) wind, solar (PV, heat and thermal electric), geothermal and marine energy (wave 
and tidal). General waste incineration has been excluded but the biodegradable fraction of waste 
has been included as renewable energy. Furthermore, large hydropower (generated by facilities 
in excess of 10 MW) has also been included. It appears, however, to have been tacitly agreed 
that large hydro will count for meeting set targets but will not be eligible for support measures.
7 
This would be the case in spite of the absence of an explicit statement to that effect in the 
approved Directive.  
Governments are allowed to continue their own support schemes for a transitional period of ‘at 
least’ seven years after a possible Commission proposal towards a harmonised Community 
framework is accepted. In principle, the Commission may propose a harmonised Community 
framework, but it is unlikely to do so in the evaluation report of member-state RES-E support 
systems, due in fall 2005.
8 
Furthermore, the Directive states that better access is to be provided to electricity distribution 
networks, including streamlining and expediting authorisation procedures at the administrative 
level. Where appropriate, member states may require transmission and distribution system 
operators to bear (fully or in part) the RES-E connection and grid reinforcement costs. When 
dispatching authorisations, transmission system operators should give priority to RES-E plants 
“to the extent possible”. 
2.3.2  State aid for environmental protection 
In 2001 the European Commission adopted an amended set of Community guidelines for 
assessing whether aid administered by member states for environmental protection is 
compatible with the internal market (European Commission, 2001). These guidelines will cease 
to be applicable on 31 December 2007. The guiding principle in assessing aid for renewable 
energy, contained in the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection, is 
that the beneficial effects of such measures on the environment must outweigh the distorting 
effects on competition (European Commission, 2001, point 5).  
Explicit reference is made to the possibility of state aid for promoting the use of renewable 
sources of energy and combined heat and power production by way of tax exemptions or 
reductions (European Commission, 2001, point 24). “Where it can be shown to be necessary” 
investment grants of the eligible costs
9 in support of renewable energy up to 100% are possible 
(European Commission, 2001, point 32). Operating aid may be justified to cover the difference 
between the cost of producing energy sources and the market price for energy (European 
Commission, 2001, point 56). In assessing such costs for, say, producing RES-E, this should be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
import from another Member State if the exporting state has accepted explicitly, and stated on a guarantee 
of origin, that it will not use the specified amount of renewable electricity to meet its own target and 
thereby also accepted that this electricity can be counted towards the importing Member State’s target” 
(European Commission, 2004, p. 18). 
7 The Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection (European Commission, 2001) 
does not include large hydro or the biodegradable part of waste incineration under its definition of 
renewable energy (ibid., point 6). This would suggest that these categories would not be eligible for state 
aid under conditions specified by these guidelines. 
8 This report should also contain recommendations on best practices on administrative procedures on 
feed-in authorisation and other grid access issues (see the last paragraph of this section). 
9 That is, the extra investment costs necessary to meet environmental objectives.  8 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
done after the deduction of any investment support (i.e. the support equivalent per unit of RES-
E). Furthermore, state aid based on avoided external costs is not allowed to exceed €0.05/kWh. 
These forms of aid should result in an overall increase of renewable energy sources and not in 
shifts from one renewable energy technology to another or from one member state with less 
favourable renewable energy incentives to another with greater state aid.  
The Commission should be notified of this aid by the member state concerned and re-notified 
every 10 years. It is then up to the discretion of the Commission to determine on a case-by-case 
basis whether or not the support measures concerned are in breach of any Community 
legislation and reach an approval/rejection decision accordingly.  
A famous judgment by the European Court of Justice concerns the compatibility of the German 
feed-in tariffs (FIT) system with the EU’s internal market regulations (ECJ, 2001). The court 
judgment negates the purview of Art. 87(1)
10 of the EC Treaty stating that any aid granted by a 
member state distorting (or threatening to distort) competition by favouring certain 
undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between member states, is incompatible with the 
internal market. The Court argued that FIT schemes were not to involve any direct or indirect 
transfer of state resources to undertakings (generating RES-E in the jurisdiction concerned) and 
not to constitute state aid within the meaning of Art. 87(1) of the Treaty. 
2.4  Market support: Scope  
Government support for RES-E may take three major forms: 
(i)  Government policy may provide RD&D support for selected fledgling RES-E technologies. 
Governments may wish to do so to facilitate technological maturity, cost reduction and 
dissemination of information on the selected commercially immature technologies.  
(ii) Governments may equally wish to support market uptake of specific RES-E technologies. 
Currently four major types of direct market support for RES-E generating technologies in 
EU countries can be distinguished. These are These are feed-in tariffs or feed-in premiums 
systems (FIT or FIP), renewables portfolio standards (RPS), investment subsidies and 
tendering systems. 
(iii) Notably, in the liberalising electricity market framework, governments may wish to 
empower consumers to be able to steer the market. Given adequate electricity-generation 
disclosure mechanisms being in place, consumers may do so by revealing preferences 
among electricity mixes with distinct shares of RES-E through the price mechanism. 
The remainder of this chapter addresses market support policies, while the next chapter focuses 
on electricity generation disclosure. (RD&D is beyond the scope of this Task Force.) Hereafter, 
four major categories of RES-E market support instruments are set out, which will also be 
assessed in the evaluation report on RES-E support by the Commission due in October 2005. It 
should be stressed, however, that there are more categories of RES-E market support (e.g. 
reduction/exemption of indirect energy tax on RES-E consumption), while in most member 
states several market support instruments are used at the same time.  
2.4.1  Feed-in tariffs and premiums  
Feed-in tariffs are preferential, technology-specific tariffs mandated by the regulator and 
guaranteed for a specified period up to 20 years. Feed-in premiums are technology-specific 
premiums (bonuses) on top of the plain electricity proceeds, mandated by the regulator and 
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guaranteed for a specified period. Feed-in tariffs/premiums are granted to operators of eligible 
domestic RES-E plants for the electricity they feed into the grid of the member state concerned. 
Generators of eligible RES-E produced in another member state are excluded from benefiting 
from RES-E support by any member state with a FIT/FIP support system, even if they can prove 
the export of their production to the latter country.
11 The tariff/premium, fixed per generator, 
may be periodically revised for new vintages of RES-E plants, in order to account for the 
decrease in production costs (‘stepped’ tariffs/premiums). This could be done, for example, by 
projecting recorded cost-reductions by way of ‘learning curves’. FIT/FIP systems have a track 
record of some two decades and are well established in the EU. In Denmark, Germany and more 
recently Spain, the respective feed-in tariffs/premiums have enabled an astounding growth of 
RES-E generation, especially wind power. To date, most member states are applying a FIT 
and/or FIP system, including Germany, France, Spain, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands.  
2.4.2  The renewables portfolio standard 
An RPS is a requirement for consumers or their retail suppliers (or alternatively, electricity 
generators)
12 to source a minimum percentage of their electricity portfolio from eligible 
renewable-based electricity.
13 The RPS system is a recent support mechanism,
14 which has been 
introduced in, among other areas, Australia, Japan and in at least 18 American states. EU 
member states applying this support mechanism include the UK, Italy, Sweden and Belgium. So 
far, the RPS schemes in the EU are national schemes. Sweden and Norway have announced that 
in 2007 they will start operating one clustered RPS scheme. To add flexibility to parties with an 
RPS obligation, a parallel system of tradable RES-E certificates (TRECs – also referred to as 
‘tradable green certificates’) is usually introduced. These certificates can be traded separately 
from the underlying electricity in a certificate market. TRECs serve as proof of eligible RES-E. 
Ultimately, affected parties will have to surrender the required number of TRECs to the 
competent authority to verify compliance with the RPS regulation or face penalties for non-
compliance. Upon submission for compliance the competent authority will then redeem (retire 
from circulation) the surrendered certificates.
15 Depending on the regulations in place, another 
reason for TRECs to be removed from the market is expiration (when the ultimate day of 
validity has passed). 
                                                           
11 This protectionist feature may be relaxed if and when member states with FIT or alternatively, FIP 
systems decide to harmonise and cluster their respective support mechanisms and merge their eligible 
support region.  
12 Most countries opting for RPS have chosen a midstream/downstream variant with the RPS compliance 
obligation assigned to electricity consumers or their suppliers (electricity distribution companies). So far, 
only Italy has opted for an upstream RPS system, imposing the RPS obligation on power generators or 
importers.  
13 Alternative terms such as ‘quota obligation mechanism’ are used as well. The term ‘renewables 
portfolio standard’ describes most precisely that a certain minimum share of the electricity portfolio of 
affected parties has to originate from (eligible) renewables-based electricity (see Espey, 2001, p. 560).  
14 The RPS mechanism was conceptualised in the US and Europe in the late 1990s. The first precursor of 
an RPS system in Europe, a voluntary one agreed upon by electricity suppliers, was conceived (van der 
Tak, 1998) and introduced (in 2000) in the Netherlands, but relinquished in 2001, resulting in a sequel of 
shifts in Dutch RES-E support policy. Worldwide, the first well-functioning RPS was introduced in Texas 
in 2000 (Sloan, 2005), while in Europe the first functional RPS dates from 2002.   
15 Subject to the prevailing regulations, TRECs may also be redeemed for other purposes. A case in point 
is Texas, where voluntary green-power programmes have to surrender TRECs (there referred to as 
‘RECs’) for verification of their product offerings.   10 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
2.4.3  Investment subsidies and fiscal incentives 
The granting of some form of investment subsidy is a support policy with a long 
implementation history. Compared with most conventional generation technologies, RES-E 
technologies tend to be characterised by high up-front investment costs per unit of electricity 
output. In order to lower the financing barrier of commercially immature RES-E technologies, 
investment subsidy instruments may be applied. Investment subsidies can be outright subsidy 
transfers or fiscal investment facilities (e.g. tax credits and accelerated depreciation). Moreover, 
the provision of finance on soft terms (e.g. at a subsidised interest rate) can be conceived as 
another type of indirect investment subsidy. By lowering the typically high upfront cost hurdle, 
investment subsidies can be especially important for those RES-E technologies that still have to 
bridge a wide cost-gap to commercial maturity. Investment subsidy instruments are being 
applied by many member states for these technologies in particular, such as solar PV. Often 
some form(s) of investment subsidy is applied as supplementary RES-E support in conjunction 
with either FIT/FIP or RPS as the main RES-E support scheme. 
2.4.4  RES-E tendering systems 
Under a RES-E tendering system, the government awards power purchase contracts by way of 
tender for a certain aggregate volume of eligible RES-E. The tenders can relate to RES-E in 
general or be technology-specific. Project developers who submit the lowest kWh asking price 
are offered a long-term power purchase agreement (PPA) until the tendered RES-E volume has 
been filled. The PPA price could be on a reversed-auction (price as bid) basis or on the basis of 
a uniform price, i.e. the highest asking price among those of the successful bidders. The 
additional costs of RES-E tenders are usually passed through to the power consumers. To date, 
Ireland and France (for 12+ MW RES-E projects) are the only member countries applying this 
support mechanism. Recently, the UK has shifted from a tender-based system (known as 
‘NFFO’ – non-fossil fuel obligation) to an RPS system, while Ireland has announced that it is 
shifting to a FIT system. 
2.4.5  Coordination of support levels 
EU-wide harmonisation of support systems does not seem a realistic prospect in the very near 
future. Yet the co-existence of quite divergent support mechanisms across member states begs 
the question of whether – and if so, to what extent – these systems generate distortions in 
Europe’s renewable electricity markets. To monitor this situation, reliable information on 
support levels in terms of €/MWh per renewable generation technology for each member state is 
urgently needed. A method for reliably gathering this information is outlined in section 4.4.2.  
2.5 Stakeholder  analysis 
Market support regulations are a crucial business-environment factor for the various stakeholder 
groups in the RES-E value chain. These regulations largely determine the extent to which each 
of them can capitalise on ‘regulatory rents’. They have features that can be beneficial for the 
whole RES-E value chain, but they also include some zero-sum game features with both 
winners and losers. Hereafter the business interests and preferences of the major RES-E 
stakeholder groups in the EU member states are described.  
Government authorities tend to be a rather diverse group of entities, both among and within 
member states. The security of energy supply and (the mitigation of) climate change are often 
invoked as the main issues to justify national RES-E policy-making. In drafting RES-E support 
schemes special attention is typically paid to achieving the national indicative RES-E target for MARKET STIMULATION OF RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY | 11 
 
2010. Yet other key motives at least as important for many member-state government 
authorities seem to be the creation of ‘national champions’, national competitive advantages and 
in-country employment, especially in regions that are economically weak. In practice (as 
distinct from official speeches), many if not all member-state governments seem to give 
precedence to these national considerations over and above the Lisbon Agenda to create a 
genuinely single European market and to improve the EU’s competitiveness. Condoned by the 
European Court of Justice,
16 so far virtually no member state is prepared to grant access to RES-
E generators from other member states to the RES-E support system under its jurisdiction. The 
choice of main support mechanism is mainly a matter of the prevailing national political culture. 
National governments pursuing industrial policies with a strong belief in the merits of central 
guidance tend to favour a FIT/FIP scheme as the main RES-E support instrument. Conversely, 
governments with a stronger belief in market forces tend to favour an RPS scheme (the UK and 
Sweden) or a tendering scheme (Ireland). In some instances, the choice in favour of a FIT or 
FIP system may also have been triggered by politically convenient reparation of previous, 
flawed support schemes (e.g. the fiscal RES-E demand stimulation in the Netherlands) or by the 
small size of the national markets concerned (as in Luxembourg), or the perceived complexity 
of RPS schemes (as in Denmark). The differential effects of the distinct support mechanisms on 
national innovation and technological diversity in the national economy are major concerns to 
the member states. Other major design concerns are various effects on end-user electricity prices 
and the size of over-stimulation (the free-rider phenomenon).  
RES-E equipment producers have a great interest in RES-E market support policies that are 
designed to i) speed up market demand for their product by way of attractive regulatory rents in 
the value chain of national RES-E generators and ii) create ‘national champions’. Demand for 
their products can be stimulated by regulation that establishes stable framework conditions for 
RES-E generators with prospects of certain, high positive cash flows over most, if not all of the 
design life of the RES-E plants concerned. Moreover, regulations that substantially reduce the 
up-front investment requirements for RES-E generators will be appreciated. RES-E equipment 
producers operating in member state(s) may also solicit national champion policies, which can 
involve a mix of elements. These may include some of the following: tailor-made R&D support; 
national testing, service centres for certification and quality assurance; launch orders for new 
prototypes by local utilities or through direct procurement (tendering or regional support 
programmes); export support, by way of ‘development aid’ and authorisation procedures 
favouring local job creation, etc.  
RES-E generators and project developers also have a keen interest in RES-E market support 
policies that will establish stable framework conditions with a high regulatory rent. Such 
regulation would entail high recurrent net cash flows over as many years of the RES-E plant life 
as politically feasible and reduction of their up-front investment requirements by way of 
investment subsidy instruments. Moreover, they favour measures to straighten out and speed up 
sticky authorisation procedures and priority – or at least level-playing-field – access to the grid 
at shallow grid-integration tariffs. Shallow tariffs, as opposed to deep tariffs, reflect only the 
cost of the connection to the nearest grid transmission line and do not include the cost of grid 
reinforcement. 
Conventional electricity generators have to weigh the impact of RES-E support regulation on 
their own bottom lines and those of their competitors, the market response of their competitors 
and the public image of their environmental performance. The latter is regarded as an important 
indicator of corporate social responsibility – an aspect of general business performance that has 
lately been given more attention by the industry. Increasing RES-E plants in the generating 
portfolio of incumbent major power producers may improve their public image and mitigate 
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their fossil fuel price risk. This risk per unit of fossil fuel is widely perceived to increase over 
time. Therefore, incumbent generators typically have no overriding objections to support 
policies that will lead to a gradual, predictable penetration of RES-E. On the other hand, they 
tend not to favour open-ended RES-E support schemes. Strong and abrupt stimulation of RES-E 
with priority grid access may upset the planned deployment of existing baseload capacity plants, 
and consequently, negatively affect the short-term bottom line of generators with large 
generating baseload assets. This effect is underscored by the fact that the short-term marginal 
costs of intermittent renewables are usually quite low. Contingent on weather conditions, they 
can put downward pressure on electricity prices. 
Transmission and distribution system operators (TSOs/DSOs) will have to accommodate the 
high technical and administrative requirements of partly intermittent RES-E generators. Strong 
and abrupt stimulation of RES-E with priority grid access may upset the planning of this 
stakeholder group to an even greater degree. The result may be congested transmission and 
distribution lines, an adverse impact on system harmonics and overburdened administrative 
departments. In this regard, an important planning consideration is that high-voltage grid 
extensions have relatively long gestation periods (typically 5-10 years). This stakeholder group 
also tends to have the fewest problems with support policies that will lead to a predictable 
penetration of RES-E. Moreover, the incidence of grid integration costs is a key concern for 
these stakeholders. TSOs/DSOs typically favour deep grid connection tariffs, i.e. the pass-
through of the lion’s share, if not all, of the additional costs attributed to RES-E grid integration 
to RES-E generators.  
Incumbent large electricity suppliers have similar considerations as their generator counterparts. 
Those incumbent suppliers that still benefit in their supply area from the absence of complete 
unbundling of transmission and distribution infrastructure ownership may resist the erosion of 
their market power by distributed generators, including renewable ones. Yet their environmental 
performance image may become a consideration of increasing importance. The population in 
north-western Europe is particularly noted for having relatively strong concerns for 
environmental issues. Prospective news coverage in the media of environmental impact as well 
as reliable electricity-origin labelling may elevate environmental interest. Again, this 
stakeholder group tends to favour support policies that will lead to a predictable penetration of 
RES-E, with a fair spread of the associated additional costs. For example, a major concern is 
that those competitors that are over-represented in national areas or in other member states that 
are poorly endowed with renewable energy resources should assume their fair share of the 
additional RES-E costs.  
Electricity users possibly constitute an even more diverse group. Thus we elaborate the position 
of two subgroups more specifically. Electricity-intensive industries are very sensitive to any 
policy that may push up – at least in the short term – the cost of electricity and will have a 
‘natural’ aversion against open-ended support schemes such as FIT/FIP systems. Moreover, in a 
similar vein to the previous stakeholder group, within-sector competitive distortions are a major 
concern. Small power consumers comprise a myriad of very different and, on average, less-
informed agents. As long as political parties or consumer/small business associations do not 
specifically canvass on one-issue themes such as ‘stop the squander of our money on windmills’ 
or ‘stop climate change’, small power consumers will not be able to significantly influence the 
outcome of the RES-E support policy debate. 
Environmental NGOs articulate a high degree of environmental effectiveness and are inclined to 
promote policies that will accelerate market penetration of RES-E. Regard for environmental 
effectiveness – as opposed to cost-efficiency – is a consideration of profound importance to this 
stakeholder group and their constituency. | 13 
Chapter 3 
The EU’s Renewable Electricity Policy: 
An Assessment of Market Support Mechanisms 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a preliminary assessment of four principal support mechanisms towards 
greater market penetration of renewable electricity. It builds upon the analysis in the previous 
chapter of the merits and objectives of renewable energy source (RES) promotion policy, the 
main instruments used to shape this policy and stakeholder positions. The criteria used for the 
assessment in this chapter are set out in section 3.2. Subsequently, given the absence in Europe 
of well-designed support systems with regard to, notably, renewables portfolio standards (RPS), 
we define four notional models optimised for pan-EU application (section 3.3) and then proceed 
to an analysis of their suitability (section 3.4). Finally, some conclusions are put forward 
(section 3.5). 
3.2 Assessment  criteria 
Based on the stakeholder analysis presented in section 2.5, the following criteria are applied to 
the assessment of support mechanisms: 
1.  Stimulation of RES-E generation. Is a support mechanism effective? Certain stakeholder 
groups (the RES-E sector and environmental NGOs) have a basic interest in fast market 
deployment. Governments that are behind schedule in their bid to achieve their respective 
indicative target may also seek fast growth.  
2.  Certainty of target achievement. To what extent can a support mechanism control the RES-
E volume or share? Member-state governments are supposed to achieve their respective 
indicative targets. To the extent that RES-E expansion entails substantial additional costs 
for electricity supply, member states may wish to avoid target-overshoot situations. Also, 
incumbent power suppliers, transmission and distribution system operators (TSOs/DSOs) 
and producers with a largely non-RES-E electricity mix may favour a predictable increase 
of RES-E generation. Many power consumers having to bear the brunt of high-cost RES-E 
may also dislike target overshoots. 
3.  Regulatory certainty after the introduction of support mechanisms. What are the risks of 
stop-go instability or the outright repeal of a support mechanism? For developing investor 
confidence in the RES-E sector, stable and long-term regulatory framework conditions are 
essential. 
4.  Level of end-user electricity prices. To what extent does a support mechanism negatively 
affect the competitiveness/affordability of end-user electricity prices?  Market support 
interventions will on average lead, at least in the short and medium term, to higher 
electricity bills. In this respect, it is a zero-sum game between support beneficiaries and 
power consumers. Given the wider societal impact, the public sector might wish to avoid 
excessive levels of aggregate additional costs for RES-E support.   
5.  Occurrence of over-stimulation. To what extent does the implementation of a support 
mechanism result in serious over-stimulation of RES-E (free-riding, low-cost, eligible RES-
E generators cashing in on unusual profits, subsequent to the implementation of the support 
mechanism)? Again, this is a zero-sum game. Generally, government officials may wish to 
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6.  Impact on technology cost-reduction and innovation. How does a support mechanism affect 
the capacity, entrepreneurial diligence and risk-taking behaviour of RES-E sector agents in 
pursuing cost-saving measures and cost-reducing innovation? To government authorities, 
stimulating cost-reducing innovation is a major priority. Given the RES-E support 
regulation in place, to agents in the RES-E sector cost-reduction in their own company 
matters as well. Yet these agents may be tempted to rally against regulation that pushes the 
regulatory rent in their sector in a downward direction.  
7.  Technology diversity. How does a support mechanism affect deployment of fledgling RES-
E technology (with a wide cost gap) in relation to technology that has come closer to market 
maturity (with a relatively small cost gap)? To the public sector, technology diversity has a 
strategic value to enhance long-term energy security. Hence, facilitating market 
development of promising high-cost RES-E as such might make sense to civil servants. To 
high-cost RES-E operators and their technology equipment providers, technology-specific 
support is crucial for their survival. With the possible exception of direct beneficiaries and 
environmental NGOs, however, most other stakeholders might be inclined to favour 
limiting the outlays of market support for high-cost RES-E technologies.  
8.  Suitability for EU-wide application. How effectively can a support mechanism limited to 
one member state be applied to all 25? Does the scheme involve many institutions or rules 
that make it a bureaucratic burden if implemented on a large scale?  
Some aspects of great concern to certain stakeholders are not considered explicitly. The impact 
on employment creation of a certain kind of RES-E expansion depends notably on the RES-E 
technology mix, on the labour intensity of the RES-E supply chain, its cost-efficiency (criterion 
4) and on the system boundary conditions (member-state or EU level). A high (low) score on 
criterion 4 would work out to be positive (negative) for the macroeconomic employment 
impact. Typically, the application of RES-E technology on a life-cycle basis is more labour-
intensive, especially when considered at the EU level. On the other hand, the higher the cost gap 
of RES-E technology compared with other generating technologies, the more important the 
negative, indirect employment impact is relative to the positive direct employment effects. As 
electricity-consuming sectors have to incur the additional RES-E costs, a high cost gap of RES-
E might well negatively affect macro-level employment levels. Hence, a priori the 
macroeconomic employment impact of RES-E is ambiguous. Although partially based on 
highly contestable assumptions,
1 Commission-sponsored research suggests that on balance, a 
substantial, positive, short-term employment impact can be anticipated from RES-E deployment 
(ECOTEC, 2003).   
Generally, contingent on the RES-E mix, the environmental impact of RES-E technology is 
much lower than other generating technologies. Broadly, this holds for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions as well as local and regional airborne pollution. Yet the efficiency of energy 
conversion on a life-cycle basis may markedly reduce the positive score of RES-E on its 
environmental performance. For instance, the ‘energy pay-back time’ of a solar PV system is 
several years. Likewise, the energy requirement for the growth of biomass feedstock, transport 
and processing can be a high proportion of the resulting biomass fuel. Moreover, on local and 
regional airborne and affluent pollution, the score for biomass-based RES-E technology 
compared with fossil-fuel based generation is mixed. Given a broadly lower impact per kWh of 
RES-E, compared with the impact per kWh of other generating technologies, the score of a 
mechanism on environmental effectiveness will be in line with its score on stimulation of RES-E 
generation (criterion 1)   
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In conclusion, other factors remaining the same (including aggregate electricity demand), the 
most effective support mechanisms for RES-E will have the highest impact on net employment 
creation and the environment. Yet a crucial ‘other factor’ for the employment effect is the extent 
of the cost gap between RES-E and electricity from conventional sources. If the scores of a 
mechanism on overall effectiveness are good and on cost-efficiency are poor, the employment 
impact is indeterminate in both size and nature. On environmental performance, the RES-E mix 
is a significant aspect. Generally stated, technologies such as wind power and geothermal tend 
to be more environmentally benign than biomass-based RES-E technologies. It should be added 
that deployment of a non-baseload renewable such as wind power – as distinct from, for 
example, a geothermal source – would need additional balancing power. To the extent that these 
additional power requirements are generated from fossil fuels, this limits the environmental 
benefits of wind power and other non-baseload renewable sources. 
3.3  Description of notional pan-EU RES-E support models 
For each of the four market support mechanisms previously introduced in section 2.2, many 
implementation variants exist. With regard to investment subsidy mechanisms, feed-in tariffs 
and feed-in premiums (FIT/FIP) and RES-E tendering mechanisms, a history of policy 
experimentation exists that goes back several decades. Conversely, renewables portfolio 
standard (RPS) mechanisms have been introduced quite recently. The RPS systems running in 
Europe are not state-of-the-art. The latter are fraught with weak design elements partly falling 
into the category “teething problems” (van der Linden et al., 2005). Given this current situation, 
an analysis of the experience gained so far in Europe with support mechanisms is prone to give 
rather poor and even outright false indications for any pan-EU coordination of renewable 
electricity support policies. 
Therefore, for each mechanism we set out some essential design elements of a notional 
optimised variant for pan-EU application and make an assessment of the expected scores – 
based on a mix of literature study and logical reasoning – for the criteria outlined above. This 
type of analysis can give far better clues for appropriate EU-wide policy coordination, as 
evidenced by the preparations for launching the most daunting EU-wide environmental policy 
instrument to date, the EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The EU ETS was even 
designed prior to significant CO2 trading experience. As a point of embarkation, four ‘pure’ 
models are depicted for assessment. Based on assessment results we venture to describe the 
contours of two ‘ideal’ hybrid RES-E support schemes. Realising that any such model is still far 
from implementation, we consider it nevertheless a useful mental exercise for future policy 
directions.  
3.3.1  Generic support model features 
In order to provide certainty to investors in RES-E plants, the support schemes are defined for a 
20-year moving period, hence in 2005 for the period 2006-25, in 2006 for the period 2007-26, 
etc. Prior to programme implementation of any of the support models, the model-specific 
parameter values for the next 10 years will be fixed, while determining indicative values for 
programme years 11 to 20. In the first programme year, indicative values for the next horizon 
year (programme year 21) will be determined and so forth. Every 5 years, starting with 
programme year 5, a major programme evaluation will be undertaken during which parameter 
values for the next 6 to 10 programme years will be fixed. For example, in programme year 5 
parameter values for programme years 11 to 15 will be fixed. This way, in the post-evaluation 
period of a major evaluation year, fixed parameter values are known for the evaluation year 
itself and for the next 10 calendar years, while indicative parameter values are known for the 
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3.3.2  A feed-in tariffs and/or premiums model  
Points of departure for the notional pan-European FIT model are the anticipated kWh cost of the 
distinct RES-E technologies, the anticipated baseload electricity price over the next 20 years and 
the budgeted RES-E subsidy fund, broken down by distinct technology. In each major 
evaluation year, technology-specific feed-in tariffs will be fixed for the next 10 years
2 (stepped 
FIT), while indicative tariffs will be determined for prospective years 11-20.
3 Eligible RES-E 
investors will be granted a long-term (say 15 years) power purchase agreement based on the 
technology-specific FIT in the applicable vintage year. The additional costs of the scheme will 
be paid by European suppliers in proportion to their sales volume and will be passed through to 
the European power consumers by way of a premium on the kWh end-user price. Electricity-
intensive industries will receive a premium discount in due consideration of the electricity costs 
of global (non-EU) competitors. The design of the alternative notional feed-in premiums model 
runs along similar lines. 
3.3.3 An  RPS  model 
This scheme will focus on renewable generating technologies that are not yet commercially 
viable without policy support but have a relatively modest cost gap among all the non-
commercial renewable generating technologies. Targets will be set at the EU level, while 
compliance will be relegated to a competent authority in each member state. Prior to the first 
programme year, RES-E technology-specific volume targets will be set for the next 20 years. 
Targets for the first 10 programme years will be mandatory, while those for years 11 to 20 will 
be indicative. In each major evaluation year, targets for the next 6 to 10 years will be fixed. 
Fairly ambitious but realistic targets
4 will be set, based on technology-specific cost 
performance, cost-reduction performance and production potentials. In order to avoid shortening 
the economic life of RES-E plants (which would increase the additional RES-E costs), no age 
limits are put on RPS eligibility.
5 Penalty payments for non-compliance will either be 
transferred to a renewables research, development and demonstration (RD&D) fund or to the 
general government budget, based on subsidiarity. In order to provide more certainty to 
potential investors, the competent authority implementing the scheme will guarantee a 
minimum tradable RES-E certificate (TREC) price well below the expected long-term marginal 
generation cost.
6 The flexibility of the RPS scheme can be enhanced by the introduction of 
                                                           
2 With the effect of the second major programme evaluation year, the rates for years 6-10 onwards will be 
fixed, with rates for years 1-5 having been fixed in the previous programme evaluation year. 
3 For technologies such as wind power and solar PV, region-specific FIT schemes can also be considered 
in a few (e.g. three or four) EU zones based on resource endowments. This may well reduce the free-rider 
phenomenon and provide more regional equity in the stimulation of economic activities related to these 
technologies.  
4 An ambitious RPS target is one that will be under-achieved in its absence. Conversely, a non-ambitious 
target will be achieved anyway. 
5 In some RPS systems eligibility is constrained to a limited period, e.g. 10 years in Italy, which tends to 
increase certificate prices and hence the additional RPS system costs for electricity users. It seems that 
legislation in Norway and Sweden is being introduced or prepared specifying technology-specific 
limitations to the eligibility duration of RES-E plants for the envisaged joint RPS. This would be a set-
back in comparison with the current situation in Sweden. Provided that eligibility durations will last at 
least 15 years, this design flaw, if introduced at all, will have an additional-cost-raising impact, albeit 
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certain well-constrained banking and borrowing options. This approach is particularly warranted 
by unpredictable weather conditions (wind, solar PV, hydro and biomass feedstock) and to 
mitigate gaming opportunities in TREC markets. 
3.3.4  An investment subsidy model  
As with the FIT (FIP) model, the starting points for this scheme are the anticipated kWh cost of 
the distinct RES-E technologies, the expected baseload electricity price over the next 20 
programme years and the budgeted RES-E subsidy fund, broken down by technology. Hence, in 
order to contain the subsidy amount the support scheme will be capped. Available technology-
specific funds will set an upper limit for the eligible technology-specific volume. Estimations 
will be based on projected technology-specific learning curves. Based on these projections, 
during each major evaluation year, the technology-specific subsidy amount per watt of rated 
capacity will be fixed. The technology shares in the RES-E investment fund will be adjusted 
based on ex post cost-reduction performance over the past five years compared with the related 
projections. Technologies showing higher (lower) cost-reductions than expected will receive a 
higher (lower) portion. Yearly RES-E fund inflows will be paid by European suppliers in 
proportion to their sales volume and will be borne by the end users through a RES-E surcharge 
on the bill. The surcharge will be per kWh with a discount for energy-intensive industries.  
3.3.5 A  RES-E  tendering model 
In this scheme, a RES-E fund will be organised in a similar vein as the previous model. Periodic 
technology-specific tenders will be held for RES-E projects with a long-term (say 15-year) 
power purchase agreement, based on unitary pricing and the highest successful bid price. A high 
penalty will be enforced on those failing to honour their bids within a given pre-set period 
without valid force majeure reasons. Penalty payments will be transferred to the RES-E fund. 
3.3.6  Treatment of high-cost technology 
High-cost renewable generating technologies need dedicated policy support within ‘reasonable’ 
additional cost limits. The FIT (FIP) investment subsidy and tendering models can handle high-
cost renewable generating technologies, such as solar PV, fairly easily in contrast with the RPS 
model. As for the latter, one approach would be to opt for a hybrid system. In this approach the 
‘generic’ RPS would be applied to high-cost technologies as well, while the cost gap with first-
tier eligible generating technologies would be bridged by alternative instruments such as 
investment subsidies or FIP with due regard to limiting the additional costs. Alternatively, 
dedicated RPS schemes could be implemented for specific technology tiers (Verbruggen, 2004; 
Jansen, 2003b) with technology-specific TRECs. The clustering of technologies may take place 
if the number of generators is limited or some generators obtain too much market power in the 
absence of technology clustering. Only technologies with broadly similar cost gaps will be 
clustered. Technology clusters with a high cost gap will initially be allotted much lower targets 
than those with a low cost gap. Depending on realisations with respect to the cost-reduction 
revealed during the major evaluations, targets for high-cost technology clusters will be adjusted 
by a high or a low percentage per year. Renewables portfolio standards will be enforced by 
penalties well above expected marginal generation costs per technology tier. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 This feature will in fact render the proposed RPS a hybrid RPS-FIP variant: the minimum TREC price 
can be considered to denote a backstop feed-in premium. The maximum TREC price acts as a cap on the 
additional cost per unit of RES-E. In conjunction with the target, the maximum TREC price also fixes the 
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3.4  Assessment of the distinct market support models 
The support models outlined in the previous sub-section have been assessed by their respective 
scores on the criteria previously set out in section 3.2. This was done under the assumption that 
for all models equally effective complementary policies on permit authorisation procedures and 
grid access would prevail. The results can be summarised as below. 
With the exception of technology diversity, the performance of the investment subsidy model 
and tendering model are shown to be poor to mediocre as the main market-stimulation 
mechanism on all scores. Therefore, it is proposed that these models be rejected as major 
market-stimulation tools. In contrast, both the FIT (FIP) and RPS schemes show strong and 
weak points. Let us focus on these two alternatives as the main market-stimulation instrument. 
Given attractively set premium tariffs, the strongest points of the FIT (FIP) model are its 
perceived simplicity and effectiveness in stimulating RES-E as well as its positive impact on 
technology diversity, including technologies that are still far from market maturity. Its weakest 
points are the uncertainties regarding target achievement, potential over-stimulation of eligible 
generators and the much stronger upward impact of these uncertainties upon end-user electricity 
prices for captive consumers. Over-stimulation results from typical FIT (FIP) rate-setting 
procedures affected by asymmetric information and the political economy of negotiations with 
special interest groups. Moreover, the supply curves for technology-specific renewable 
electricity are much steeper than for aggregate renewable electricity. Hence, even if the 
regulator were to avail of perfect information and holds his own without government 
interference against a well-organised lobby of special interest groups, the free-rider 
phenomenon would still be substantial. Further, given the assurance of demand at pre-set prices 
(premiums) in the FIT (FIP) system, the incentives for risk-taking by renewable generators to 
introduce cost-reducing technology and measures are limited. With reference to criterion 8, an 
EU-wide FIT (FIP) system can contain two equalisation mechanisms carried out by the grid 
operators: one for the paid subsidies and one for the physical volumes fed into the grid. The 
expansion of this mechanism across the EU would involve high transaction costs and extensive 
electricity transport operations.  
The strongest points of the RPS model are the likelihood of target achievement, stimulation of 
cost-reducing innovation and regulatory certainty. Market-based incentives such as RPS in the 
absence of dominant market players do stimulate risk-taking to introduce cost-reducing 
innovation.
7 In addition, in a large market such as the EU, the supply curve of renewable 
electricity is rather flat, making for a relatively modest occurrence of the free-rider 
phenomenon. Once a well-designed RPS system is in place with long-term target-setting, it can 
provide relatively strong regulatory certainty. This relates to its innate capacity to assure target 
compliance under a strong compliance enforcement regime and its comparatively good degree 
of cost-effectiveness. A FIT (FIP) system can also be relatively stable but the inherent political 
risk associated with a FIT (FIP) system is larger, notably if and when the overall FIT system 
costs are mounting. With reference to criterion 8, a possible EU-wide TREC scheme involving 
many traders and one issuing and clearing body is regarded as a means of low transaction costs. 
Only certificates have to cross borders. As distinct from the FIT scheme, the price equalisation 
process would take place automatically and volume transactions would not be needed because 
of equal quotas for suppliers and the separation of the power and certificates markets. 
A generic RPS model notably stimulates renewable technology with a modest cost gap. More 
technology diversity can be promoted through technology banding. Yet in this respect the FIT 
                                                           
7 A wealth of literature exists attesting to the positive relationship between the extent of market 
competition (engendered for example by well-designed market-based instruments) and cost-reducing 
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system scores better. Alternatives to a generic RPS model are complementary investment 
subsidies or fiscal incentives. A hybrid RPS/FIP or RPS/FIT model could also be envisaged. In 
fact, the US case with RPS programmes in 18 states and a federal PTC (production tax credit) of 
some $18/MWh for some qualifying renewable technologies works out as a hybrid RPS/FIP in 
the RPS states concerned. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Judging from both the experience gained over several decades and theoretical considerations, 
neither the investment-subsidy model nor the tendering model seem to perform well as a main 
support mechanism for renewable electricity. As for FIT (and FIP) or RPS systems, no clear 
candidate as the major market-stimulation model for eventual harmonisation has presented itself 
in Europe so far. FIT schemes have been applied in Denmark, Germany and Spain with a 
remarkably positive impact on the deployment of wind power technology, if with a rather high 
subsidy per kWh. RPS systems have a rather short history so far in Europe with many teething 
problems regarding sub-optimal design features. Some of these sub-optimal features are 
currently being addressed. In some American states such as Texas and California, and to some 
extent in Sweden as well, experience to date with RPS is promising.
8 At present, in the latter 
cases additional costs per kWh of RES-E support are lower than under any successful FIT 
system to date. Therefore, it is premature to reject RPS as a main support mechanism to 
stimulate renewable electricity.
9 Furthermore, from 2007 nationally-restricted member-state 
support schemes will be at odds with the mandated full opening of the EU electricity market 
taking effect at that time.  
Improvement of current FIT (FIP) and RPS schemes towards best practice is highly desirable. 
Moreover, bottom-up clustering of either FIT (FIP) or RPS market stimulation models should 
be encouraged. Development towards a harmonised RPS/FIP or RPS/FIT system is fully 
consistent with the unfolding internal electricity market. A total withering away of market 
stimulation of renewable electricity is not envisaged in the foreseeable future.  
It is essential that stable framework conditions be offered to investors in renewables-based 
generation plants. Stop-go stimulation policies for deployment of renewable technologies that 
are not yet commercially mature can deter potential investors and destabilise fledgling 
renewable energy industries. Long-term renewable electricity targets are recommended with a 
periodic updating procedure and an ambition level that reflects a judicious balance between the 
concerns of electricity users and renewable energy industries.  
                                                           
8 Some of the success of the US RPS examples are owing to an accompanying fiscal measure, the federal 
production tax credit (PTC). Likewise, the deployment success of some European FIT systems have been 
amplified by accompanying fiscal measures, such as investment subsidies, accelerated depreciation and 
subsidised interest programmes.  
9 A recent spate of publications suggest explicitly or implicitly that a FIT system would be more cost-
effective on a generic basis than RPS by merely comparing the German FIT system to the UK RPS 
scheme. There is an inherent risk, however, of being misled by general conclusions drawn from 
comparing national systems, as such comparisons do not account for specific weaknesses in the system 
design. 20 | 
Chapter 4 
Empowering EU Consumers to Drive the Market 
for Renewable Electricity 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers electricity generation attribute disclosure and verification in the EU, 
focusing on renewable electricity. Information on renewable electricity is or can be used for a 
range of applications. It is enshrined especially in existing EU legislation that electricity 
consumers have a right to know the fuel mix of the electricity delivered to them for reasons of 
transparency and consumer choice.  
This chapter sets out the merits of electricity generation attribute disclosure and verification 
(section 4.2) and summarises existing EU legislation (section 4.3). The main EU-wide legal 
requirements concerning renewable electricity encompass the mandate to member states to have 
a system in place to issue renewable energy guarantees-of-origin (RE-GOs) at the request of 
renewable electricity generators. Section 4.5 provides a preliminary analysis of stakeholder 
positions on this issue, while section 4.6 reviews the implementation of RE-GO schemes in the 
member states so far. Section 4.7 compares this with the current achievements in implementing 
disclosure and authentication requirements, as prompted by existing EU legislation. Special 
attention is given to the current lack of transparency for consumers as a result of the ongoing 
potential for multiple counting problems and inconsistent statistics on the renewable electricity 
performance of the member states. Section 4.8 presents recommendations to improve the 
transparency, accuracy and reliability of renewable electricity information in the member states.  
4.2  Reliable electricity generation information: Merits and pre-conditions 
Obviously, transparent, easily accessible, accurate and reliable electricity-generation 
information is essential for consumer protection. It not only enables consumers to make more 
informed choices, it may also improve market efficiency as it may stimulate competition with 
new entrants in the market offering ‘green electricity products’. Finally yet importantly, 
consumers willing to pay a premium price for offerings with an over-representation of 
renewable electricity over electricity from non-renewable sources can drive the electricity 
market towards enhanced environmental sustainability.  
Along with liberalisation of the electricity sector, governments may wish to improve consumer 
protection and enable consumers to influence the generation fuel mix.  
Given the failure of the power market to spontaneously provide transparent, accurate and 
reliable electricity-generation information, governments may resort to introducing and enforcing 
effective legislation to that effect. For example, electricity suppliers could be required to further 
disclose product information to consumers of their as yet not well-understood products.  
The capacity of consumers to stimulate – by their deliberate, voluntary choices – the generation 
of renewable electricity crucially depends on the legislation in place for electricity generation 
attribute disclosure and verification. Introduction and enforcement of appropriate legislation 
will permit the realisation of potential demand from voluntary markets for additional renewable 
electricity. This will be supplementary to demand from compliance markets. In the latter,   
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affected parties have certain obligations to generate, supply or consume renewable electricity 
through regulatory market support systems such as feed-in tariffs (FIT) and renewables 
portfolio standards (RPS). 
This necessitates the existence of consumer choice among a range of electricity products, 
differentiated in a clear way by price, contract conditions, reliability of service and (especially) 
electricity generation attributes such as the fuel mix. Moreover, a reliable verification system for 
electricity product offerings is warranted for reasons of consumer protection and the effective 
functioning of the electricity market.  
Current efforts by the EU member states to stimulate the market uptake of renewable electricity 
are centred on the implementation of market support instruments. The two most important 
instruments are FIT (FIP) and RPS programmes, typically complemented with investment 
subsidies or fiscal incentives (or both). With some exemptions, the member states have so far 
neglected to facilitate the emergence of voluntary markets as a driver of demand for renewable 
electricity on an additional basis in favour of ‘compliance markets’ (the uptake of eligible 
renewable electricity mandated by FIT or RPS regulation). Experience in the US suggests, 
however, that in areas with reasonable access to credible green power offerings at least 1 to 2% 
of residential consumers are disposed to buying renewable electricity for roughly a $5 to 
$40/MWh premium (Bird & Swezey, 2004). Corporations would tend to go for the lower values 
in this range. In Europe, especially in the presumably more environmentally concerned 
northwest, the potential for voluntary markets may be greater. This should be determined by 
well-designed market research.  
Policy-makers wishing to boost renewable electricity can ill afford to ignore the additional 
potential of voluntary markets. Yet, before consumers may wish to drive the electricity market, 
consumers need to be able to trust that they really receive what is implied by their electricity 
provider. Consumers subscribing to a certain green power product should be able to ascertain 
that his of her choice will really matter in order for green power to penetrate into the market. 
4.3  Current EU legislation 
4.3.1  Disclosure and verification of electricity from renewable sources 
In accordance with the Renewables Directive (2001/77/EC), “to facilitate trade in electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources and to increase transparency for the consumer’s 
choice between electricity produced from non-renewable and electricity from renewable energy 
sources, the guarantee of origin of such electricity is necessary” (recital 10, European Council, 
2001). An allusion to another application of an origin guarantee for electricity from renewable 
sources is made in the Directive. It regards the accounting for the percentage contribution of 
renewable electricity sources (RES-E) in 1997 and the target year 2010. The Directive states 
that “In the case of internal trade of RES-E (with recognised certification or origin registered) 
the calculation of these percentages will influence 2010 figures by member state but not the 
Community total” (Annex, third note to table).  
Member states are to have introduced a renewable energy guarantees-of-origin (RE-GOs) 
scheme by 27 October 2003 at the latest. They are to ensure that a RE-GO is issued in response 
to a request (Art. 5(1)). RE-GOs should confirm that the origin of electricity generated in their 
respective territories from renewable energy sources, including that from 10 MW+ hydro power 
plants, can be guaranteed throughout the EU according to objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory criteria. The information requirements to be included in a guarantee of origin are 
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(i)  specify the energy source from which the electricity was produced, specifying the dates 
and places of production, and in the case of hydroelectric installations, indicate the 
capacity; [and] 
(ii)  serve to enable producers of electricity from renewable energy sources to demonstrate 
that the electricity they sell is produced from renewable energy sources within the 
meaning of this Directive (European Council, 2001).  
RE-GOs are to be mutually recognised by the member states “exclusively”
1 as proof of the 
aforementioned elements (Art. 5(4)). Further, appropriate mechanisms are to be put in place to 
ensure that RE-GOs are both accurate and reliable.  
4.3.2  Disclosure and verification of electricity from co-generation of heat and 
power plants 
To increase transparency for the consumer’s choice between electricity from co-generation and 
electricity produced on the basis of other techniques,
2 the CHP Directive (2004/8/EC) mandates 
the member states to introduce a scheme of guarantees of origin of CHP electricity (CHP-GOs). 
These shall be issued at the request of CHP generators (Art. 5(1)). Appropriate mechanisms are 
to be put in place to ensure that the CHP-GOs are both accurate and reliable (Art. 5(2)). Further, 
according to Art. 5(5), a CHP-GO shall specify: 
•  the lower calorific value of the fuel source from which the electricity was produced, the use 
of the heat generated together with the electricity and finally the dates and place of 
production; 
•  the quantity of electricity from high efficiency cogeneration in accordance with Annex II 
that the guarantee represents; and 
•  the primary energy savings calculated in accordance with Annex III based on harmonised 
efficiency reference values established by the Commission (European Council, 2004a). 
Member states may include additional information on the guarantee of origin. CHP-GOs should 
be mutually recognised by the member states, exclusively as proof of the aforementioned 
elements (Art. 5(6)). On the tradability of CHP-GOs the CHP Directive is rather vague. No 
specification is given on any form of linkage of CHP-GOs with RE-GOs (Directive 
2001/77/EC) or with the verification of electricity origin disclosure (Directive 2003/54/EC).  
4.3.3  Generic electricity origin disclosure 
The Electricity Market Directive (2003/54/EC, Art. 3(6)) mandates that, 
Member States shall ensure that electricity suppliers specify in or with the bills and in 
promotional materials made available to final customers: 
(a)  the contribution of each energy source to the overall fuel mix of the supplier over the 
preceding year; [and] 
(b)  at least the reference to existing reference sources, such as web-pages, where 
information on the environmental impact, in terms of at least emissions of CO2 and 
the radioactive waste resulting from the electricity produced by overall fuel mix of 
the supplier over the preceding year is publicly available. 
                                                           
1 In principle, the word “exclusively” can be interpreted as ‘only’ or as ‘on an exclusive basis’. 
Presumably the legislator refers to the former connotation. 
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With respect to electricity obtained through an electricity exchange or imported from an 
undertaking situated outside the Community, aggregate figures provided by the exchange or 
the undertaking in question over the preceding year may be used. 
Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the information provided by 
suppliers to their customers pursuant to this Article is reliable” (European Council, 2003). 
4.4  Scope of applications for RE-GOs 
The scope for useful applications for guarantees of origin with renewable electricity as the 
underlying source for commercial and official purposes is rather broad. The following 
(potential) applications can be distinguished (Uyterlinde et al., 2004, chapter 2): 
Applications for commercial purposes 
•  proof of a certain quantity of qualifying renewable electricity to substantiate claims for 
market support – eligibility for feed-in tariffs, for example, which could be made contingent 
on the surrender of commensurate RE-GOs; 
•  evidence for affected parties in member states with an RPS scheme to substantiate claims 
regarding compliance with the scheme’s standard; and 
•  proof of a claim to the attributes of a certain quantity of renewable electricity by way of 
public disclosures, reports and statements. Examples include the disclosure of the electricity 
supplier/product fuel mix and the associated environmental profile, disclosure of the fuel 
mix of electricity consumption in annual corporate social responsibility reports and ‘green’ 
commercial messages.  
Applications for public policy purposes 
The aggregation of generation attribute information enabled by comprehensive RE-GO 
accounting systems can facilitate the monitoring of system-wide trends. Useful applications for 
policy-makers include:  
•  generating reliable and accurate statistics for monitoring the production and use of 
renewable electricity in the EU; 
•  providing information on aggregate market support levels per renewable technology in the 
EU member states in €/MWh to facilitate coordination of the different support frameworks. 
This requires dedicated standard attributes for this purpose and detailed instructions on how 
to express a support measure in €/MWh; and 
•  ensuring accurate, reliable and consistent proof of target compliance by a member state. 
Several of these potentially quite useful applications are not yet implemented in most EU 
countries. Some of the uses are not even explicitly endorsed in current EU legislation, albeit 
none is explicitly excluded either.  
4.5 Stakeholder  positions 
Because of the apparent complexity of the issues, so far many stakeholders have refrained from 
communicating their respective positions on electricity generation attribute disclosure and 
verification. Nonetheless, in this section we attempt to sketch how the interests of distinct 
stakeholder groups will presumably be affected. We focus on the verification of renewable-
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Government authorities have to weigh the perceived benefits of introducing a reliable 
(renewable) electricity generation attribute information system against its perceived 
implementation burden. It appears in order for the European Commission to provide more 
objective information on this issue. Some rather pervasive misunderstandings are: 
i)  The costs of a reliable RE-GO accounting system on the basis of a central electronic 
tracking platform would have a significant adverse impact on the cost of electricity. If the 
costs were allocated on a pro rata basis to electricity consumption and system demand is 10 
to 500 TWh/year, the cost per kWh will be in the range of €0.001 to €0.030 ct/kWh. Hence, 
in most member states the costs of a reliable RE-GO accounting system will be below 0.1% 
of the electricity bill.  
ii)  In a member state with a FIT scheme, a reliable RE-GO accounting system would have no 
use. Yet the previous section shows that such a system has several valuable applications. In 
fact, implementation of a reliable RE-GO system is indispensable for implementing the 
Renewables and Electricity Market Directives (2001/77/EC and 2003/54/EC). These 
Directives mandate the member states to ensure that in their jurisdiction both the RE-GO 
system and the electricity mix disclosures of electricity suppliers are accurate and reliable. 
This holds irrespective of the renewable electricity support mechanisms in place. 
The renewable-electricity business sector (comprising generators, project developers and 
technology providers) still has to position itself on the subject matter. So far, the sector is most 
concerned with rallying for market support mechanisms that create the highest and most certain 
regulatory rent for the renewable-electricity value chains. Nevertheless, reliable electricity 
generation attribute disclosure and verification through RE-GO trade is essential for stimulating 
the market broadening of renewable electricity in the EU and for harnessing the potential of 
additional demand for renewable electricity from voluntary markets. The message that reliable 
RE-GO accounting systems are very compatible with FIT schemes still needs to get across to 
many representatives in this stakeholder group. 
Incumbent generators will tend to weigh their position on the impact of reliable electricity 
disclosure on their competitiveness relative to their main competitors. Generators with a 
relatively large share of ‘green’ generating facilities may see their position as improved against 
those with an over-representation of nuclear and fossil-fuel generating facilities. In contrast, the 
latter may favour continuation of the current rather opaque situation regarding reliable 
disclosure of generation attribute information.  
Transmission and distribution system operators (TSOs/DSOs) may feel an initial reluctance 
towards implementation of a reliable disclosure and verification system. This might be 
compared to reluctance to implement a new business information system in a company. Once 
the fairly complex introduction phase has been completed, however, these stakeholders may 
particularly find that a reliable verification system will greatly facilitate a number of their public 
tasks. Specific advantages relate to their possible role in the transfer of market stimulation 
subsidies, assignment of the residual mix to suppliers and in operating a central registry and 
electronic platform for transacting RE-GOs. 
For incumbent suppliers, more or less the same applies as with the incumbent generators. To 
some extent there is a difference in that they are closest to the end users. If on the part of 
consumers there is significant potential demand for more environmentally benign electricity, 
efficient client-oriented suppliers may try to acquire a competitive edge by offering a selection 
of green electricity products. 
Electricity users will generally appreciate being offered a number of real options regarding 
electricity products as well as suppliers. Price-sensitive consumers may care less about green 
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premium products and green suppliers. Typically, commercial users wishing to develop a green 
profile among their target clients may be prepared to pay a relatively modest premium, while a 
relatively small proportion of households may be prepared to pay a relatively large premium. As 
in other economic domains, end users will trade off quality against price with a range of 
different price-quality preferences. What is essential for consumers to enable them to make 
informed choices is that the information disclosed is relatively simple and trustworthy. This 
feature and the minimisation of dishonest information disclosure can only be enforced by rather 
strict regulation on disclosure standards and verification.   
Environmental NGOs will generally favour credible implementation of the transparency aspect 
for the principle of consumer choice. These stakeholders will especially favour enhanced access 
for consumers to reliable green options (for example, see Greenpeace International, 2005).  
4.6  Variations in the implementation of RE-GO accounting schemes 
The Renewables Directive (2001/77/EC) leaves much scope for the member states regarding the 
implementation details of their respective RE-GO schemes. As a result, the schemes vary a lot 
in design across member states. A design classification of the national RE-GO systems that are 
currently in place is below (adapted from Vrolijk et al., 2004). 
•  Minimum implementation. In the minimum compliance implementation model the 
information content of the RE-GOs and their regulatory structure is limited to the basic 
requirements stipulated in the Renewables Directive. Such a regulatory structure can be set 
up at minimal cost and in a relatively short time. But the potential benefits from this level of 
implementation will also be very limited. 
•  Advanced implementation. Some key features of national RE-GO systems that can be 
classified as advanced are: i) automatic issuance of RE-GOs when eligible renewable 
electricity is being generated and ii) introduction of a central registry to monitor the issue 
and transfer of RE-GOs. A central electronic register will greatly enhance the potential uses 
of RE-GOs. Introduction of a redemption system and information attributes on the nature 
and preferably also the level of direct support granted to the commercialisation of the 
underlying renewable electricity is essential to reduce the potential of multiple counting. 
Yet it should be noted that so far not many member states have done so. Some advanced 
implementations of RE-GO systems have introduced mutual interfaces for the cross-border 
transfer of RE-GOs. The initial set-up costs of the advanced implementation model are 
higher than those in the minimum compliance scenario. But the operating costs for issuance 
and transfer activities as well as the quantitative scope for multiple counting are less.  
•  Partial policy integration. RE-GO systems in the partial policy integration model are used 
for some commercial or official applications (see previous section), though not yet in a fully 
integrated way. Moreover, redemption procedures and at least qualitative information 
attributes on market support for the underlying renewable electricity have been included in 
these RE-GO systems. As a result, both the benefits and reliability (i.e. reduction of the 
multiple counting potential) of RE-GO systems in this class have been improved.  
•  Full policy integration. Under this scenario, RE-GO systems in the partial policy integration 
model are used for some commercial or official applications in a fully integrated way. 
Moreover, the systems under this model have moved towards a certain degree of mutual 
harmonisation. This greatly facilitates cross-border RE-GO trade among the member states 
concerned. As a result, both the benefits and reliability (i.e. minimisation of the multiple 
counting potential) of RE-GO systems under this model are highest compared with those in 
the other three classes.  26 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
 
The current situation regarding implementation of RE-GOs in the EU-15 member states is 
shown in Table 4.1. The table reveals that a lot of policy effort is still warranted to capture the 
full benefits of the RE-GO systems in the EU for a variety of policy purposes. Such purposes 
notably include reliable generation attribute disclosure of renewable electricity and cross-border 
trade in RE-GOs, for instance to improve the accessibility and affordability of (reliable) green 
electricity products for European consumers. 
Table 4.1 Implementation status of RE-GO systems in the EU-15: Situation in October 2004 
Not 
implemented 
Minimum 
compliance 
Advanced 
implementation 
Partial policy 
integration 
Full policy 
integration 
France 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Germany 
Ireland 
Belgium (Brussels) 
Denmark 
Finland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Sweden 
UK 
Austria 
Belgium (Flanders) 
Belgium (Wallonia) 
Netherlands 
None 
Source: Adapted from Vrolijk et al. (2004). 
 
4.7  Disclosure and authentication 
As set out above, several EU directives require member states to promote transparency for the 
consumer’s choice in EU electricity markets. Retail suppliers should provide end users reliable 
and accurate information on the company fuel mix and its associated environmental profile for 
the previous year. Given the transparency objective stated in EU legislation, this also tacitly 
holds for green electricity offerings and green electricity quality labels issued by several 
environmental NGOs for voluntary markets, etc.  
Yet current practices in most EU member states are still far from ensuring that such information 
by retail sellers in their jurisdiction is indeed reliable and accurate. For this to happen, the 
member states will ultimately have to enforce the following conditions (as per Sedano, 2002): 
•  fairly strict standards for company and product disclosure labels that are well understood by 
the average customer and facilitate comparisons between suppliers and products. Moreover, 
requiring broadly standardised, transparent information makes consumer-deception abuses 
more difficult; and 
•  a reliable and credible system of substantiation by a comprehensive accounting system of 
electricity generation attributes preferably covering all generation sources.  
The member-state RE-GO systems have to be fully compatible to enable cross-border 
transactions. This requires, for example, full harmonisation of technology nomenclature and 
other attributes to be embedded in the GOs, rules for retirement, expiration period and other 
accounting system operation rules. For this purpose a voluntary scheme, the European Energy 
Certificates System (EECS), can be a point of departure. The EECS has been developed by 
RECS
3 and has been adopted by six EU member states. The New England power pool   
 
                                                           
3 For further information about EECS, see the RECS website (retrievable from http://www.recs.org). MARKET STIMULATION OF RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY | 27 
 
generation information system (NEPOOL GIS) introduced in six states in the US sets a good 
example for addressing the practical implementation issues of an advanced, robust, harmonised 
multi-state certificate system.
4 
The most serious problem impeding the voluntary market from taking off is the occurrence of 
multiple counting. This problem, which needs to be addressed by policy-makers, happens either 
inadvertently or results from outright fraud when: 
•  incompatible commercial claims are made more than once over the same quantity of 
renewable electricity production (using more than one kind of ‘proof’ or using one proof, 
say a RE-GO, more than once); or  
•  the electricity underlying commercial claims has not been produced at all.  
Companies directly involved may claim generation attributes that they do not own or may use 
certain generation attributes they do own more than once. Another related potential problem is 
inconsistent statistics on a member state’s renewable electricity performance in a target year. 
Let us give one example for each problem without going into further details. 
Legislation introduces a FIT scheme in order to make eligible renewable generators competitive 
with their counterparts using non-renewable energy sources. At the same time, however, it 
allows the sale of RE-GOs by generators benefiting from a FIT scheme. These RE-GOs are 
typically used by electricity suppliers for green product disclosure. As a result of this situation, 
the buyers of green power products get the wrong impression that their choices have a positive 
impact on additional renewable electricity production commensurate with their uptake. If the 
legislator were to require beneficiaries of competitive-making FIT support to surrender their 
RE-GOs, this multiple counting case could be resolved. The system operator may add them to 
the residual mix that consists of, for instance, the electricity used for system balancing and 
system losses as well as unspecified imports. Subsequently, the system operator may assign the 
residual mix for disclosure to all electricity providers in all their offerings under the legislator’s 
jurisdiction on a pro rata basis. Green electricity products should hence be ‘greener’, i.e. contain 
more renewable electricity than the residual mix. Allowing FIT scheme beneficiaries to transfer 
their RE-GOs not only is at odds with transparency as it does not meet environmental 
additionality, it inhibits green consumers to steer the power market towards a more sustainable 
direction. A major (but by no means the only) example of this multiple counting problem is in 
the EU’s largest market to date for green power products, the Netherlands.   
Inconsistent statistics on a member state’s renewable electricity performance can stem from the 
export of RE-GOs issued in a target year, say 2010. It is likely that in the case of cross-border 
RE-GO trade, most exporting member states do not wish to relinquish their right to count the 
underlying renewable electricity for their target compliance. EU legislation would only allow 
counting renewable electricity of imported RE-GOs towards the target of the importing member 
state if the exporting member state has provided an approval earmark (see chapter 2, footnote 
6). Consumers in the importing country of RE-GOs without such a target attribute may be under 
the impression that total disclosed consumption of renewable electricity gives a good indication 
of their country’s renewable electricity performance.  
Improving the consistency of information on the deployment of renewable electricity is to 
invariably base renewable-electricity target compliance by member states on renewable 
electricity production. Member states would still be allowed to pool their targets, but each state 
would remain accountable for achieving its target should the joint target of the regional ‘bubble’ 
not be met (Jansen, 2005a). If target achievements (the nominator of target percentage) are 
                                                           
4 For further information, see the websites (retrievable from http://www.iso-ne.com/committees/ 
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based on production, member states may prove this either by means of national RES-E 
production statistics or, alternatively, by statistics on the aggregate issuance of RE-GOs upon 
national renewable generation during the target year. With advanced RE-GO systems in place, 
the latter option is the most reliable and thus preferred. If target achievement is also based on 
national renewable-electricity consumption, then from the perspective of reliability and 
transparency for consumer choice, member states should prove target achievement, based on 
RE-GOs redeemed to cover renewable electricity consumption during the target year. From the 
same viewpoint, such RE-GOs would then automatically include those imported from other 
states. In keeping with current realities, it is recommended that the European Commission 
unequivocally specifies that target achievement be measured by national renewable-electricity 
production.  
4.8 Conclusions 
Important first steps have been taken in EU legislation to foster transparency for consumer 
choice. Yet quite a few steps still need to be taken towards the genuine empowerment of 
electricity consumers to drive the EU power market in a more sustainable direction. The 
following ‘best practices’ are recommended for the design of robust, credible and accurate RE-
GO accounting systems, which can facilitate all the distinct market-support systems in place: 
•  One competent organisation per member state under close public scrutiny and at arm’s 
length from electricity generators and suppliers should be made responsible for operating 
the RE-GO system, maintaining one central registry that can interlink with those of other 
member states. 
•  A RE-GO should be automatically issued as the unique proof of a certain MWh of 
renewable electricity generation for whatever purpose, with comprehensive coverage of 
renewable electricity.  
•  The attributes carried by a RE-GO should be able to facilitate all useful commercial and 
public policy purposes. RE-GOs should be compatible across member states to facilitate 
cross-border trade.  
•  Member states with competitive-making FIT systems should effectively forbid FIT-eligible 
renewable generators from transacting RE-GOs with underlying FIT-supported electricity. 
This would preferably be done by requiring the redemption of RE-GOs for obtaining FIT 
support, with the accounting system operator assigning these RE-GOs to electricity 
suppliers on a pro rata basis. Legislation in some member states with a FIT system in place, 
allowing FIT-eligible renewable generators to transact RE-GOs (e.g. in the Netherlands), is 
incompatible with the objective of transparency for consumer choice as stipulated in the 
Renewables, Electricity and CHP Directives.  
•  Member states with an RPS should use their RE-GO system instead of a parallel TRECs 
scheme for compliance verification. Legislation in some member states with an RPS scheme 
in place, which defines the TRECs as purely financial instruments (e.g. Sweden and the 
UK), is also incompatible with the objective of transparency for consumer choice.  
•  For substantiating the veracity of green electricity products, corresponding RE-GOs should 
be mandated for redemption. No generation attributes of underlying renewable electricity 
should be allowed as disclosure proofs if competition-inducing market support has been 
received, for example through FIT or RPS systems, unless the particular RE-GOs have been 
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RES-E target compliance by member states should be based on production targets. Member 
states should be allowed to pool their production targets, with each individual member state 
remaining accountable for achieving the joint target of the ‘bubble’ region. This procedure – as 
opposed to cross-border transactions in RE-GOs with(out) an approval ‘earmark’ of the 
exporting member state – would ensure consistency of information on renewable electricity 
statistics while not hampering cross-border trade in RE-GOs.  
In the background of liberalising power markets, European legislators need to give due attention 
to consumer protection and empowerment.  30 | 
Chapter 5 
Obstacles to a Greater Presence  
of Renewable Energy Sources 
Grid Integration and Administrative Barriers 
his chapter investigates barriers to the increased penetration of renewable electricity 
(RES-E) in the EU. The main stumbling blocks are the grid integration of renewable 
energy sources (RES) in the electricity system and administrative matters related to the 
authorisation of RES-E projects. The management of these two issues is decisive if renewable 
energy sources are to increase their share in electricity generation. This is for two main reasons. 
First, as a result of the fact that the grid was not created with the expectation of such a high 
RES-E percentage, a higher RES-E capacity has to be supplemented by technical and 
operational modifications along with infrastructure improvements. Second, to meet RES-E 
penetration targets it is necessary to create a process that will facilitate the increased presence of 
RES-E generation units in a timely and simple manner.  
The Renewables Directive (2001/77/EC) sets the indicative target of having renewable sources 
provide the power for 21% of the electricity generated in the EU-25 by 2010. The 
accomplishment of this target will require a very strong presence of RES-E, which has ranged 
from 12.9% in 1997 to 15.2% in 2001 and is currently around 13%.
1 Given that almost all hydro 
capacity is already exploited, the main source able to cover the remaining capacity requirements 
and to do so in a cost-effective manner is wind energy.
2 In this context, our discussion about the 
grid integration of RES-E will mostly be concerned with the integration of wind energy into the 
network.
3 
5.1  Grid integration of renewable energy sources in the electricity 
system 
It is acknowledged in the literature
4 that growth in wind capacity is not matched by investment 
in the long-term development of the network, either in planning or in committed long-term 
R&D. Yet in order to sustain reliable power-system operation in the future with significant 
amounts of renewable energy, as well as conventional energy, a new philosophy in the design 
and the operation of the system is needed. The grid not only needs to be extended and reinforced 
to better absorb and conduct the renewable energy generation with its specific characteristics – 
new approaches in the operation of the conventional generators and the transmission and 
distribution networks are necessary. Moreover, the completion of the internal energy market 
creates opportunities for increased cross-border trade in electricity. Integration of member-state 
markets will result in the Europeanisation of issues that used to apply only at the member-state 
level, such as load management, interconnector investments and cross-border trade.  
                                                           
1 This approximation is made according to the values presented in the Green-X Project Final Report 
(University of Technology, 2004).  
2 See also the IEA (2004) World Energy Outlook study, concerning both the reference and the alternative 
policy scenarios. 
3 Biomass is also expected to acquire an increasing share in the next five years, yet its integration does not 
really constitute a grid issue.  
4 See for example Sustainable Development Commission (2005), Justus (2005), Union for the 
Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) (2005) and ETSO   (2005).  
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The grid integration of an increasing share of wind energy will amplify a number of technical 
and operational challenges to the network. The intermittency of wind power and the 
geographical concentration of wind farms (with an increasing share of those that are offshore 
and often located in remote areas) are known features, which will multiply in scale and scope in 
the forthcoming 5-10 years. The effective management of issues arising from the greater share 
of RES in the EU energy mix and in direct relation to the grid integration of renewables is 
crucial so as not to impede the projected future penetration of wind power.  
5.1.1  Issues to be addressed for wind integration 
Wind power has been rapidly increasing its share in Europe’s energy mix and is expected to 
continue in the years to come. The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) expects a rise 
in European wind capacity from ca. 34,000 MW in 2004 to 180,000 in 2020, of which a large 
proportion of future capacity is expected to come from offshore installations.
5 
The large-scale integration of both onshore and offshore wind raises a number of issues with the 
various stakeholders involved, from generation, through transmission and distribution, up to the 
power market and the demand side. A number of issues are technical, such as: a) connection 
rules and system stability; b) system adequacy; c) grid infrastructure; d) balance management on 
the generation side;
6 e) operation of the transmission and distribution grids; and f) legal and 
ownership unbundling of generation and transmission/distribution activities. The capacity of the 
power system to absorb wind power is, however, determined more by economics and power 
market operation than by absolute technical and practical constraints.
7 
a) Connection rules and system stability issues 
In order to avoid a negative impact on the network, especially if there is a substantial amount of 
distributed and embedded generation, technical criteria (interconnection regulations and grid 
codes) for grid connection are being applied for most RES-E generation technologies. The 
detailed requirements that have to be met by distributed generators (in our case by RES-E 
generation) mostly depend on the voltage at the point of common coupling between the 
embedded generator and the grid infrastructure.  
In several EU member states the interconnection regulations for wind power are being further 
refined, in order to allow for larger penetration and at the same time to maintain an adequate 
power supply. The great variety of national regulations is not always an advantage for the wind 
turbine manufacturers. Yet at the moment an EU-wide homogenisation of interconnection 
regulations designed for high penetration situations is not desirable either, partly because the 
level of wind power penetration is still very low in most member states, and partly because 
some national requirements pose an unduly heavy impact on the wind turbine design and cost 
(and hence on the investors and operators of wind farms). Regulations should take into account 
specific power system robustness and RES-E penetration level. Costly technical requirements – 
such as fault-ride-through capability and the voltage control possibilities of wind power stations 
– should be included only if they are technically required for reliable and stable power system 
operation. The actual wind power technology in any case includes advanced solutions to enable  
 
                                                           
5 Offshore wind-installed capacity will reach 10,000 MW (75,000 MW of wind total) by 2010 and 70,000 
MW (180,000) in 2020 according to EWEA targets (retrieved from http://www.ewea.org). For further 
input on wind power issues, see De Carolis & Keith (2005). 
6 For items a, b, c and d, see Ackermann (2005). 
7 See the report by the UK Sustainable Development Commission (2005) and Holttinen (2004). 32 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
 
the wind power plants to contribute to system stability in those few areas where wind power 
forms a substantial part of the power supply, such as northwest Germany, west Denmark and 
some areas of Spain.
8 
b) System adequacy issues   
System adequacy is related to the long-term effect of RES-E on the power system and more 
specifically concerns the question of to what extent intermittent RES-E such as wind power can 
replace some of the conventional capacity – and at the same time enable the power system to 
adequately maintain power supply at any moment, even in critical grid situations with an 
unchanged risk. This contribution of wind RES-E is quantified in the parameter termed 
‘capacity credit’. 
The impact of intermittent RES-E wind on the adequacy of power production in the system is 
determined by the reliability of the RES-E production during peak load situations. From 
analysis and practical experience it follows that variable sources such as wind power do save on 
and enable the closing down of thermal capacity. Several studies have examined this issue
9 and 
all have concluded that the capacity credits of wind power at low wind penetration are at least 
equal to the average capacity factor. As the amount of wind on a system increases, the capacity 
credit (as a fraction of the installed wind power) decreases. 
Geographical dispersion of RES-E generation facilities (enhanced by more interconnections) 
and positive correlation between the RES-E power and demand increase their capacity credit in 
the system, and hence their contribution to the system security of supply. In order to assist the 
strategic planning of power systems, a continuous effort is needed to improve the insight into 
the statistical behaviour of the intermittent energy sources, e.g. by systematic output monitoring. 
c) Grid infrastructure issues 
A number of detailed, country-specific and international studies have been published concerning 
grid extension/reinforcement requirements and the corresponding costs of the large-scale grid 
integration of wind power (see Box 5.1). Estimations are based on comprehensive load flow 
calculations on the national transmission grids.  
The studies quantify the grid extension/reinforcement requirements and the related costs 
incurred by a variety of factors.
10 These factors include requirements for increases in generation 
to meet demand (in general) and (in particular) necessary measures and costs for large-scale 
wind integration. The analyses are based on the load flow simulations of the corresponding 
national transmission and distribution grids, which take into account different scenarios of 
national wind integration utilising the most favourable sites. The country-specific studies 
indicate that the grid extension/reinforcement costs caused by additional wind generation are in 
the range of €0.1 to €5/MWh wind, with the higher value corresponding to a wind penetration 
of 30% in the system (in the UK). More studies and a consistent approach to the method used 
are needed to develop a reliable empirical relation between grid extension/reinforcement costs 
and wind energy penetration. Nevertheless, it may be useful to highlight the problems identified 
in the studies and the variety of results yielded. 
For example, according to the DENA (2005) study, Germany will require 850 km of new 380 
kV for the next 10 years to integrate the projected number of wind farms.
11 New line 
                                                           
8 This assessment comes from EWEA (2004). 
9 See Giebel (2005). 
10 See Auer et al. (2005). 
11 This value is taken from the DENA study (2005); for more information, see Box 5.1. MARKET STIMULATION OF RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY | 33 
 
construction poses a dual challenge, on the one hand being investment and on the other being 
licensing. Procedures for licensing the construction of new lines can be long and often new lines 
face public opposition owing to landscape alterations (see also the next section on 
administrative barriers). 
Box 5.1. Cost estimations for wind power integration: Selective assessments 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook (2004) expects that by 2030 over 
40% of wind power will be generated by offshore wind farms, which will have a substantial impact on 
generation costs. Unit costs of wind power will range from €35 to €42 per MWh. Additional costs will 
cover reserve capacity maintenance and balancing as well as grid costs. The aggregate costs for the 
grid integration of wind energy are estimated at ca. €4 to €12 per MWh. 
The March 2005 study by the German Energy Authority – widely known as the DENA study – 
examined the interface between wind energy development and grid issues for the German network up 
to 2020. According to the study’s results, extensive grid construction is necessary to accommodate an 
increasing percentage of wind power in the country that is already the largest wind energy producer in 
Europe, namely 845 km of new 380kV links and 395 km of reinforcement of existing links. The costs 
are estimated to be €1.1 billion. The interconnection of offshore wind farms to the mainland network 
will cost approximately €5 billion by 2015. According to the study’s findings, the real costs of every 
additionally generated kWh of wind energy would amount to 6.3-6.5 €ct (2007). By 2015 costs will be 
reduced to 4.3 and 3.0 €ct depending on the assumptions of each calculation model (CO2 prices, 
additional measures, etc.) (DENA, 2005). 
The report by the Sustainable Development Commission (the UK government’s independent 
advisory body), Wind Power in the UK, estimates that the generation cost for onshore wind power is 
around 3.2 p/kwh (€0.05) and around 5.5 p/kwh (€0.08) for offshore power. The study calculates that 
€0.17 p/kwh will be the additional system cost when there is 20% wind power on the system.  
Delays in grid construction signify further delays in the integration of RES-E. Public inquiries 
can also potentially delay construction of essential transmission line upgrades by up to two 
years and create serious implications for the new planned wind capacity.
12 
One of the solutions could be to better coordinate wind farm development with infrastructure, 
particularly doing both in parallel. A first step could be to undertake an EU-wide grid impact 
assessment and the elaboration of what needs be done to accommodate an increased share of 
wind energy, as was done with the DENA study in Germany.  
Another issue is who should bear the costs and whether additional incentives are necessary for 
new wind-energy related to (but not only) grid infrastructure (i.e. the transmission capacity to 
bring energy to the grid).
13 Infrastructure improvements are certainly necessary to counter grid 
congestion. That is not to say that wind energy is the sole – or main – cause of power 
congestion in a system, since established generators or changes in demand may provoke an 
equal burden on the grid infrastructure. Yet it should be highlighted that, historically, grid 
extension and reinforcement costs have not been financed by or paid for by the electricity 
generation project developers. There may be justification for EU-wide guidelines on who should 
pay these costs.
14 In any case, on its own the provision in Art. 3 of the Renewables Directive 
(2001/77/EC), which gives priority access to RES-E in the network, might appear somewhat 
insufficient to address the issue, especially with regard to offshore wind.  
                                                           
12 For a concrete example from Scotland, see Ofgem (2004). 
13 For further discussion on the allocation of transmission grid connection charges and an assessment of 
deep versus shallow connection costs, see Hiroux (2005).  
14 ETSO argues for harmonisation – see ETSO (2003 and 2005). 34 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
 
d) Balance management of operation issues on the generation side 
Fluctuations in the overall output of RES-E generation place an additional duty on the 
remaining generating plants in the system and increase the requirements for system balancing 
services, especially when these fluctuations become comparable in magnitude with the 
fluctuations of demand.
15 Key issues to address concerning balance management include:  
•  Reduction of uncertainty. It is important to stress that system balancing requirements are not 
assigned to back-up a particular plant type (e.g. wind), but to deal with the overall 
uncertainty in the balance between demand and generation. Moreover, the uncertainty to be 
managed in system operation is driven by the combined effect of the fluctuations in both 
demand and generation from conventional and renewable sources. These individual 
fluctuations are generally not correlated, which has an overall smoothing effect with a 
consequent beneficial impact on costs. In power systems with high penetration, such as in 
Denmark and Spain, practice has shown that good wind forecasting is critical to successful 
operation, because it reduces the uncertainty in the balance between demand and generation.  
•  Balancing costs. System balancing requirements and costs are increased by random 
fluctuations and forecast errors, of both intermittent generation and load, since these are 
generally not correlated. Numerous country- and region-specific studies have attempted to 
calculate additional costs for the increased controllable capacity allocated to wind 
generation (see Box 5.1). The disparity of estimations makes the case for a study funded by 
the Community in which the system’s needs at present and in the future will be thoroughly 
assessed and quantified. Scientific evidence supports the view that modest amounts of wind 
energy up to 10% of peak demand can be assimilated without incurring additional cost or 
changes in operating procedures.
16 It can be demonstrated that power balancing 
requirements owing to wind mainly address secondary control and reserve power in the 
system (tertiary control), which in general is offered on the balancing market. The 
regulation costs should be allocated to the corresponding balancing markets. In practice, the 
balancing market prices should send out the correct price signals to the market competitors 
so that the network remains stable. It is worth underlining that balancing power needs and 
costs can be significantly reduced by establishing intra-day, hour-ahead national and 
international commercial trading possibilities, and by establishing common, international 
regulating power markets that always utilise the cheapest available resources within the 
available transmission capacities. 
•  Curtailment of RES-E. If wind generation reaches large penetration in a system with other 
forms of dispersed embedded generation on line, there may be occasions when the number 
of conventional large generation units needed to supply the remaining load will be so few 
that adequate capacity of central short-term balancing services cannot be maintained. In 
some situations, renewable generation could potentially exceed demand during a few hours 
of the year. A number of pre-planned actions are essential to deal with such potential 
surpluses of renewable generation, as prioritised with respect to cost. The easiest strategy – 
interconnection being set apart – is to have some renewable plant under central control and 
for this to be curtailed, as with fossil thermal plants. The least costly options could be to 
increase demand under ‘demand-side management’, for example by additional pumping at 
pumped storage facilities and water supply reservoirs or in the future by hydrogen 
production. Modern wind turbines will be able to provide response and reserve power to at  
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least 10% of their output. If there is still surplus generation left, some of the renewable 
generation would need to be taken off-line, starting with the technologies with the highest 
marginal costs (highest fuel costs), such as biomass. 
•  Ancillary services for generation. Apart from balancing requirements from the energy 
perspective, the power system requires so-called ‘ancillary services’ supplied by generators, 
ranging from operating reserve and reactive power to short-circuit current contribution and 
black-start capability. Intermittent RES-E is not suitable for producing such services in a 
dispatchable, controllable way; thus in parallel with the implementation of RES-E in the 
system, appropriate equipment should be maintained to provide the ancillary services. 
e) Operation of the transmission and distribution grids 
•  Transmission level. In addition to the considerations of managing energy and power balance 
in the transmission system (discussed above), high levels of intermittent generation also 
have other implications for the operation of the transmission system. Active voltage control 
in the system (for example in the neighbourhood of large wind farms) may be required in 
order to cope with unwanted voltage changes. Another issue is the management of the 
power flows and possible congestions in the grid. For this purpose, transmission system 
operators (TSOs) also need to be provided with high quality wind forecast tools. The 
forecast errors need to be acceptable up to a few hours ahead, meaning that the errors are 
small enough to enable the TSO to cope with the actual situation at an acceptable cost.  
•  Distribution level. The addition of RES-E (distributed/embedded generation) to distribution 
grids has implications for system operation: 
-  There is very little so-called ‘active’ management of distribution grids. 
-  The ‘distributed generation’ adds a further set of circumstances (e.g. changes from full 
generation to no generation) with which the grid must cope, without reducing the 
quality of supply seen by other customers. 
-  The direction and quantity of real (active) and reactive power flows change, which may 
affect the operation of grid control and protection equipment. 
-  Design and operation practices may no longer be suitable and need modification. 
On the other hand, RES-E brings along the following advantages: 
-  Weak grids, with reduced voltage under load, can be reinforced by the RES-E. 
-  Associated power controllers for the embedded generation can improve both active and 
reactive power characteristics. 
-  The power from the embedded generation does not entail transmission costs if, as is 
likely, this power is consumed within the distribution grid network. 
-  Local ‘island’ operation may, in principle, be possible in the event of transmission 
failures. 
Distribution grids may have to become more ‘actively managed’. This approach implies costs, 
and requires the development of suitable equipment and design principles, but the improved 
grid yields collateral benefits for the distribution grid operator. 
Cross-border cooperation and coordination can facilitate solutions. Steps in this direction would 
entail better coordination among the stakeholders involved (TSOs, farmers-E operators and 
other generators) and efforts towards enhanced coordination among member states to improve 
the integration of RES-E in the European electricity system. It may even require the 
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harmonisation of national support schemes to offset concentration, and the increase in 
renewable electricity could initiate a reconsideration of unlimited priority dispatch. The question 
for policy is at what percentage of renewable electricity entry this could be considered.  
5.1.2 Market  re-design  issues 
In view of the issues discussed above, many European electricity markets still have structural 
deficiencies and inefficiencies in their balancing and settlement procedures that discriminate 
against intermittent RES-E generation. Therefore, a re-design of corresponding market 
structures and procedures is seen as a precondition for integrating a significant total capacity of 
intermittent RES-E into the national and international networks. At present this especially 
applies to wind power, for which there are capacity expectations. 
Addressing technological development in the short to medium term, the implementation of 
improved forecasting tools will mitigate the intrinsic intermittency of wind generation and, 
subsequently, reduce corresponding costs for balancing the system. Furthermore, interconnector 
capacity has to be increased, also to facilitate a better functioning of the internal electricity 
market. The future role of new, advanced storage technologies, such as battery and fuel cell 
systems, in providing corresponding balancing services is not yet clear. Therefore their market 
entry cannot yet be predicted or quantified. 
Long-term and fundamental market re-design should focus on having manageable loads on the 
demand side. Such loads should change sympathetically with changes in generation, especially 
of intermittent generation. This kind of management will reduce both system balancing and 
system capacity requirements substantially and hence their costs. The preconditions for the 
significant implementation of demand-response applications are: i) the implementation of 
known and future technologies for communication between supply and demand; and ii) tariffs 
that encourage rapid and sufficient demand-side load changes in response to the needs of 
supply, i.e. that have minimal transaction costs for consumers. 
Nevertheless, the active integration of the demand-side response in overall system operation is 
indispensable. This will subsequently minimise the additional requirements on the system 
related to substantial intermittent RES-E generation in the future. 
5.1.3 Horizontal  policies   
Better integration of RES-E (and wind in particular) into the electricity network has to take into 
account both the member-state and the cross-border dimensions. The latter is especially 
important for those geographic locations in the EU where proximity among national systems 
allows for frequent RES-E cross-border presence. A number of actions to facilitate integration 
could be taken:  
•  ex ante (i.e. forward) rather than ex post (i.e. reactive) planning to address grid extension, 
balancing and administrative concerns in relation to RES-E projects would allow for more 
efficient grid integration;  
•  greater coordination and information-sharing among regulators and TSOs in order to benefit 
from best practice and develop common RES-E integration strategies; 
•  EU harmonisation of member-state grid access codes and standards for network equipment 
to improve efficiency and avoid the duplication of costs and resources; 
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•  increased funding for research, development and demonstration (RD&D) related to grid 
integration issues for EU member states, particularly on the topics of 
-  cross-border load management and coordination; 
-  the design of modern grid systems capable of handling increased amounts of RES-E; 
-  the elaboration of a methodology for extra transmission cost allocation (more 
specifically, is it the taxpayer or the customer who should pay?); 
-  improved forecasting, storage and grid infrastructure; and 
-  proposals for how to maximise the potential of distributed generation as an instrument 
that will also contribute to system stability; 
•  consideration, after wind reaches a certain level of market maturity, of the re-examination of 
priority rules and the participation of RES-E in the maintenance of a stable system; and 
finally, 
•  greater support for distributed generation in relation to renewable electricity integration as a 
complementary policy. While not a panacea, it is still an important factor for cost-efficiency 
and better utilisation of the existing network and capacities. The discussion about 
distributed generation is elaborated in Annex A. 
5.2 Administrative  barriers 
5.2.1 Authorisation  issues 
Authorisation relates to another set of issues that project developers face in obtaining the 
necessary permits to set up a renewable power plant. The focus here is on wind power projects, 
but similar issues apply to other renewables if not always to the same extent. 
Legislative and regulatory barriers 
In most member states project proposals will be screened on their compliance with a range of 
legal requirements. Legislation is mostly concerned with spatial planning (i.e. the location of 
plants and surroundings) and other effects such as noise and natural diversity (Box 5.2). 
As a consequence, project developers have to cope with an accumulation of authorisation 
procedures, each of them providing scope for other stakeholders to prolong or even block the 
eventual authorisation altogether. Typically, a substantial part of the complaints filed have a 
tacit or explicit NIMBY (not in my backyard) content. For onshore wind projects authorisation 
procedures may take two to seven years,
17 and in some cases (Greece) it has led to accusations 
of totally ‘freezing’ the development of the market.
18 The track record of authorisation 
procedures for offshore wind projects is even more inefficient, as until recently no clear 
procedures were established on the division of responsibilities among the different government 
authorities concerned (in the Netherlands).  
One must ask the question of why so much legislation is enacted for RES-E. The answer would 
mainly refer to the fact that we are still on the steep upper slope of the learning curve and have 
little experience to use for improvement. In this sense – and also in connection with the next 
section on public opinion – the present state of legislation reflects the need for improved 
consultation and process-streamlining.  
                                                           
17 This period applies in the Netherlands and Scotland.  
18 Note, for example, the press article in the To Bήµα newspaper (13 April 2005) concerning the race for 
renewable energy sources in Greece. 38 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
 
 
Box 5.2. Legislation concerning wind projects 
•  Spatial planning laws involve competent authorities on different hierarchical levels (e.g. central, 
provincial and local government) while civil construction works laws involve the local government 
as the competent authority. 
•  Environmental management laws warrant favourable environmental impact assessment for granting 
the environmental permit.  
•  Noise disturbance laws intend to limit noise ‘pollution’. Competent authorities are typically at the 
local and/or provincial level. 
•  Nature diversity laws aim at protecting endemic plants and animals, notably birds. The competent 
authority is typically the central government. 
•  Laws for the management of water and road infrastructure seek to protect and promote the 
efficient use of the public infrastructure. The competent authority is the central government. 
•  Electricity laws, while focussing on transmission and supply of electricity, may have mandatory 
market access for eligible renewable generators under their purview as well. Typically, the national 
regulatory authority of the electricity sector establishes the grid connection costs and whether an 
applicant renewable generating facility is eligible for preferential treatment.  
 
Public opinion and mixed competence barriers 
The increased penetration of RES-E and wind power in particular has meant that an increasing 
number of wind turbines are present in areas closer to cities and villages. The visual impact of 
turbines and the noise generated are potential deterrents of public support and could provoke 
opposition. NIMBY attitudes are usual and frequent, especially in tourist areas or those with 
tourism potential. The involvement of local communities in the planning and authorisation 
procedures is a good strategy for raising public awareness but often results in delays and 
postponements. What is therefore needed is a differentiated approach per region, not so much 
for the planning aspects but for communication.
19 There is a need to better justify projects, 
which could be done through information campaigns and transparent consultation procedures 
that facilitate full public participation.
20 It must be noted that domestic and SME consumers 
would prefer to buy electricity generated from renewable sources rather than from coal, gas or 
nuclear plants.
21  
Another issue that could hinder the greater presence of renewable energy sources is the 
existence of several layers of competence governing the authorisation of generating units. 
Requirements by the numerous authorities involved (national, regional and municipal) often 
lead to investment uncertainty, a multiplication of efforts and potentially greater demands for 
incentives by developers in order to offset investment risks or the initial capital intensity of the 
project (see Box 5.3).  
 
                                                           
19 See Best Practices on Successful Implementation of Wind Energy on a Regional and Municipal Level 
by the SIWERM Project (2005) (retrieved from http://www.siwerm.org). 
20 See Egenhofer & Legge (2001), p. 21. 
21 This indication has been among the main findings of the report by Arvidson et al. (2003), Consumer 
Attitudes to Electricity Disclosure in Europe (retrieved from http://www.electricitylabels.com/ 
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Box 5.3. Conditions influencing the development of RES-E at the national, regional and 
municipal levels*
 
-  National policy and legislation 
-  Local political context and knowledge about RES-E and issues 
-  Mobility of local RES-E actors to boost public awareness and support 
-  Cultural differences 
-  Stakeholder interaction 
-  Interrelations with other policies 
-  Moving forces for RES-E expansion 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
*These points are an elaboration on the findings of the SIWERM Project (2005). 
 
5.2.2  Steps for improvement 
As the situation on authorisation procedures differs appreciably among the member states, 
measures for improvement can only be formulated in a broad fashion. The Renewables 
Directive (2001/77/EC) mandates shortening the complete authorisation process. This can only 
be realised by the strong commitment and involvement of central governments together with 
regional and municipal authorities – but with very clear competences for each level. The 
following measures can help facilitate compliance with the spirit of the Renewables Directive. 
A distinction is made between policy objectives for an EU RES policy and those measures 
aiming at improving authorisation procedures at the member-state level. 
Policy objectives and best practice 
•  There is a need to differentiate between the two policy objectives, i.e. the promotion of 
RES-E in the EU energy mix in the long term and the establishment of the necessary 
measures to expedite the authorisation procedures for RES-E generation units, and the 
relative appropriate connection capacity to the grid in order to meet set targets on time.  
•  The two objectives are directly related, yet each requires a different approach. The former is 
based on setting the necessary framework in place such as long-term network 
improvements, improved methodologies for load management and enhanced cooperation 
among TSOs, awareness campaigns about the role of RES-E, and their potential impact on 
landscapes and communities. The latter initially appears as a short- to medium-term issue 
since it deals with the facilitation of RES-E projects per se in a managerial manner. The 
added value of meeting this objective applies to both the successful implementation of 
short-term RES-E penetration targets and the demonstration of best practice for future 
projects and longer-term commitments. 
•  The implementation of these two policy objectives is a member-state competence. There is 
scope, however, for a review by the Community of procedures that obstruct market 
development for RES and accordingly the proposal of policies based on best practice from 
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Facilitation of authorisation procedures 
•  There is a need to establish regional one-stop authorisation agencies that will be in charge of 
processing authorisation applications and providing assistance to applicants. 
•  The authorisation procedures need to be streamlined; those related to the filing and 
addressing of complaints by other stakeholders should be integrated, with clear timescales 
for their completion. The decision structures also need to be simplified with clear attribution 
of responsibilities. The European Commission may specify guidelines on the total length of 
the authorisation process for specific generating technologies as well as transparent and 
affordable opportunities for applicants to appeal. 
•  Suggestions have been made to limit the power of lower-level authorities, in such a way that 
they cannot obstruct authorisation of renewable electricity plants on ‘unreasonable’ grounds 
or by imposing ‘unreasonable’ constraints, for example, on the equipment size. A possible 
solution could come from Germany, where municipalities are required to assign locations 
that are available to project developers for a targeted level of renewable-electricity 
generating capacity. On the other hand, ‘top-down’ solutions can raise intense opposition. 
Member-state traditions would provide the best indicators of how to proceed in each 
country.  
•  The engagement of the public through better (i.e. open) communication is a prerequisite for 
public acceptance, but what is most important is that developers consider the specific 
characteristics of each region. 
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Chapter 6 
Harmonisation or Coordination of National Policies 
he EU has set overall objectives for renewable energy sources (RES) but leaves it largely 
to member states as to how to achieve these objectives. Member states are free to choose 
whatever instrument they see fit. Nevertheless, support schemes need to be in accordance 
with EU law. Most notably, EU member-state policies need to comply with internal market and 
competition rules
1 as well as the subsidiarity principle.  
6.1  National support schemes in the internal energy market  
All marketable goods and services (other than pure military items) are in principle traded, 
actually or potentially, in the internal market. The EC Treaty imposes both the establishment 
and  the proper functioning of the internal market, as only when both are ensured can one 
reasonably expect the economic objectives of market efficiency to be achieved. Therefore, the 
internal market combines the free movement of goods, services, capital and workers as well as 
the right of free establishment across intra-EU borders, combined with the necessary regulation 
to deal with market failures at the EU level and competition policy to make it function properly. 
Although national support schemes are not in contradiction of the principle of freedom of 
establishment, as long as there is no discrimination of investors, they could ultimately be found 
in contradiction of the free movement principle if member states are not prepared to grant 
renewable electricity (RES-E) generators from other member states access to the RES-E support 
system under their jurisdiction (see section 2.5, Stakeholder analysis).  
Once an internal energy market genuinely exists, restrictions related to this general principle 
will be very difficult to uphold by member states. Yet liberalisation of the EU electricity (and 
gas) market was designed to be a gradual process. The framework set by the Electricity Market 
Directive
2 fixed a minimum level of competition at member-state level by way of common rules 
while progressively bringing down barriers to cross-border trade. It was expected that market 
dynamics would unleash competitive forces, which would remove remaining barriers to the 
functioning of a fully competitive and integrated EU market.  
This framework does not, however, automatically imply that in order to function properly there 
is a need for total harmonisation, but rather for a common framework. For shared competences, 
as in the case of the internal energy market, Art. 5 concerning subsidiarity
3 stipulates that “only 
if and in so far as the objectives…cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states” should these 
be achieved by EU action. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaty, i.e. the proportionality principle.  
The subsidiarity principle, as a means to identify the proper level of government in a multi-tier 
system, provides guidance on how to assign competences to the appropriate level of government, 
i.e. the EU, member-state, regional or local levels. In this manner subsidiarity is a two-way 
                                                           
1 This includes secondary and case law. 
2 See the initial 1996 Directive concerning common rules of the internal market in electricity (96/92/EC) 
as recently amended by 2003/54/EC (European Council, 1996), plus Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (European Council, 2003d). 
3 Art. 5 TEC on subsidiarity stipulates that for “areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed actions cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states and can therefore, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action 
by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty”.  
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principle. The application of the subsidiarity principle could result in assigning a government 
function to the EU, member states or the sub-national level. Subsidiarity seeks to maximise the 
benefits of centralisation by moving beyond the regional/country level for a number of specific 
reasons that are enumerated; first there are economies of scale (e.g. research in new energy, 
administrative centralisation such as common inventories or larger and hence more efficient 
markets); and second, there are cross-border externalities (e.g. negative externalities such as 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies or grid effects, or positive externalities such as increased security of 
supply for the EU) (see for example Pelkmans, 2001). 
The proportionality principle necessitates a justification for assigning a specific function to the EU. 
If a subsidiarity test concludes that there is a need to act at the EU level, the next step is to identify 
the most suitable, i.e. ‘proportional’ instrument. In some cases, coordination of member-state 
policies may work or a comparison of best practices may be appropriate. If coordination does not 
work, more centralising approaches would be needed such as EU-wide regulation.  
6.2  The timing of harmonisation and coordination 
While gaining significant experience in the EU with renewables support schemes, competing 
national schemes could be seen as healthy at least in a transition period. Competition among 
schemes should lead to a greater variety of solutions from which to choose. As long as volumes 
remain relatively low, cross-border externalities should remain limited. Such competition will 
find its constraints where national schemes erect barriers to trade or distort competition. 
Nevertheless, the recently observed cross-border effects of large quantities of wind-based 
electricity generation suggest that the cross-border consequences of national renewables policies 
have to be properly taken into account.  
As such, policy harmonisation will be beneficial for reasons of cross-border externalities (e.g. 
impact on the grid and the security of supply for neighbouring countries and more generally, 
potential effects on the functioning of the internal energy market) or economies of scale, should 
a tradable certificate scheme be chosen (i.e. leading to larger, more liquid and efficient markets). 
If national policy frameworks develop largely independently from each other, future 
coordination or harmonisation across member states could be more difficult. Once different 
national or even regional schemes have fully taken root, convergence may well become more 
difficult as has been witnessed in many cases, such as with value added taxation (VAT) 
schemes. There are effectively three co-existing VAT schemes: a national one, a scheme for 
EU-wide transactions and a scheme for external transactions. Although the EU-wide scheme 
was meant to be transitional and eventually merged with national schemes, member states did 
not agree and operators got used to the situation and came to accept matters as they were. 
Among other reasons, this is why the European Commission has decided in the case of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading to develop an EU-wide scheme, later to become the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (see for example Egenhofer & Mullins, 2000; Zapfel & 
Vainio, 2002). The proliferation of national schemes such as those in Denmark and the UK as 
well as other countries that have planned similar schemes has been seen as a threat to the 
integrity of the internal market (Egenhofer & Legge, 2002).  
In the short-term, it can therefore be argued that the potential cross-border effects need to be 
balanced with the reality that support schemes are emerging through a bottom-up approach, i.e. 
member states are experimenting with how to make such schemes best fit into national 
circumstances. There is, however, a medium- and long-term need for harmonisation of the entire 
sphere of RES-E. To differentiate this sphere, national support-scheme frameworks can be 
separated into three distinct parts: i) level of support, ii) support-scheme models and iii) the 
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The level of support has a direct impact on decisions related to project development by 
providing locational signals. Hence, different levels of support schemes may distort investment 
decisions and provide incentives for gaming. Gaming generally undermines the efficiency of 
markets and risks creating development imbalances across borders, such as the problems 
associated with concentration as described in chapter 4. Moreover, it may lead to inefficient 
investment decisions, whereby a location is chosen on the merit of the support scheme rather 
than its resource endowment. The level of support would also include benefits that accrue from 
the fact that renewables will not have to pay for the full costs in all cases. Harmonisation of the 
level of support would reduce incentives for gaming.  
Another area is harmonisation or coordination of the different models of support schemes. In 
order to avoid a negative impact on the internal energy market or the internal market as such, at 
some stage there will be a need to agree on a common support scheme at least for the same 
technologies. There may be no need to have a uniform system across the EU for all 
technologies. But the same technologies should fall under a support mechanism to be agreed 
upon by all member states. 
The third level of harmonisation of support schemes is the creation of an EU-wide regulatory 
framework for support. While many aspects will remain the responsibility of the member states, 
such as permitting and more generally the administration, the implementation of renewables 
support policy will need to be undertaken within a common EU framework. Different elements 
of this framework can be developed within different timeframes.  
6.2.1 Support  schemes 
From the perspective of transition towards one internal electricity market, the issue of 
harmonisation of support for renewable generating technology arises. So far, the market shares 
of renewable generating technology eligible for market support are still fairly modest in most 
member states. Yet stocktaking and information dissemination of best-practice design features 
should take place. Further, it is imperative that reliable, standardised data be collected on 
aggregate support levels to promote the market uptake of distinct technologies in each member 
state. This enables policy-makers to compare the intensity of policy efforts on the one hand and 
to expose undue market distortions on the other, allowing for differences in national renewable 
resource endowments. 
6.2.2  Renewable electricity targets 
The European Commission should provide further unequivocal clarification on the nature of 
renewable electricity targets at member-state level. For the proper functioning of cross-border 
trade in RE-GOs and transparency for the consumer’s choice, the property right to (all of) the 
attributes endorsed by RE-GOs should be with the legal holders of such titles. Therefore, an 
unequivocal interpretation of the RES-E targets specified in the Renewables Directive 
(2001/77/EC) is recommended. These targets are consumption targets in that the denominator of 
the indicative RES-E targets mentioned in the Renewables Directive is clearly gross electricity 
consumption. Yet there are no indications that member states wish to relinquish the right to 
count renewable electricity generation on their territories towards their respective targets. 
Therefore, interpreting the nominator as a production target will not only create transparency 
and pre-empt the need to create additional ‘target attributes’ for RE-GOs, but will also be in 
keeping with current realities. As a result of this interpretation, cross-border trade in RE-GOs 
will not be hampered by the red tape or transaction costs associated with target attributes.  
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To promote a stable investment climate for renewable industries and to provide more certainty 
for all the stakeholders involved, it is desirable to set long-term targets with a roll-over 
procedure. In doing so, due consideration will have to be given to limiting the additional costs 
for electricity users. 
6.2.3 Guarantees-of-origin  schemes 
The Renewables Directive envisages a role for RE-GOs to facilitate trade in renewable 
electricity and to increase transparency for the consumer’s choice. To be able to achieve these 
objectives, it is imperative to implement harmonised (fully compatible), reliable and accurate 
RE-GO systems covering renewable electricity on a comprehensive basis. To that effect, cross-
border externalities related to trade in renewable electricity guarantees and consumer protection 
are compelling arguments. Furthermore, such RE-GO systems are indispensable for the 
facilitation of a range of other commercial and official applications, not least of which is reliable 
and accurate generation-attribute disclosure. Introduction of harmonised, dependable and 
accurate RE-GO systems is a key stepping stone towards a fully comprehensive GO system. 
This, in turn, will help to prevent the duplication of effort in electricity certification for other 
policy purposes such as (reliable) generation attribute disclosure and certification of electricity 
from high-efficiency heat and power plants. Clear guidance by the Commission is warranted to 
define the details of harmonised RE-GO systems.  
A stepped approach could be envisaged, which involves: 
1.  implementing standardised, compatible, national RE-GO systems of the ‘partial policy 
integration’ or ‘full policy integration’ variant, with EU-wide mutual recognition. To ensure 
genuine transparency for the consumer’s choice, this should be done rapidly by 2006; 
2.  encouraging member states to agree bilaterally or multilaterally on conditions for the cross-
border trade of RE-GOs, with the possibility of using tradable guarantees of origin to fulfil 
national RES-E targets. It is obvious that opportunities for multiple counting must be 
eliminated in this context; 
3.  fostering harmonisation of demand-pull systems for RE-GOs (feed-in tariffs and premiums, 
renewables portfolio standards, etc.); and 
4.  promoting EU-wide interlinkage of all fully compatible, national RE-GO systems.  
6.2.4  Grid integration and authorisation procedures  
Grid integration for RES-E will require the forward planning of grid extension, balancing and 
administrative issues in relation to RES-E projects. In this way, the RES-E share will increase 
and at the same time the necessary infrastructure will be in place to support it. Towards that end 
an EU-wide study of grid needs will be necessary. The results and success of the next steps will 
depend on the degree of coordination and information-sharing among system operators. A first 
step would be to harmonise member-state grid access codes and standards for network 
equipment to improve efficiency and avoid duplication of costs. Research, development and 
demonstration funding should be increasingly focused on improved forecasting, storage and 
grid infrastructure, among other issues.  
The Renewables Directive mandates the shortening of the entire authorisation process. This is a 
member state-led process and not many actions can (or should) come from the Community. 
‘Learning-by-doing’ and best practice imported from other member states can foster the growth 
of RES and preserve national traditions and priorities. The establishment of one-stop 
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complaints, and the clear allocation of competences among national, regional and municipal 
authorities will accelerate authorisation processes and reduce investment uncertainty. 
Engagement of the public through open consultation and a better justification of projects will 
facilitate full and long-term participation by the public.  
6.2.5  The relation between the EU ETS and the Renewables Directive  
The EU Renewables Directive aims at having renewable sources provide the power for 21% of 
the electricity generated in the EU-25 by 2010. The overall EU target has been broken down 
into national targets, which are set out in the annex of the Renewables Directive. The 
Renewables Directive requires member states to support development of renewable sources 
through support mechanisms, which in most cases takes the route of financial support. The two 
policy instruments – the ETS and support for RES-E production – pursue different objectives. 
One aims at increasing the share of renewables (i.e. supply) while the other at reducing GHG 
emissions (i.e. supply and demand measures).  
There is, however, an important interaction between the two instruments and their two aims. 
The amount of emissions from the covered installation will correspond exactly to the amount of 
allowances allocated plus the amount of certified emission reductions and emission reduction 
units allowed into the ETS market through the Linking Directive (2004/101/EC). The purpose 
of the ETS is to ensure GHG emissions reductions. This means that additional RES-E 
production has no CO2 effect as the caps under the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) remain 
unchanged. If the renewable power production increases, the covered sector will either sell or 
bank surplus emissions rights (which accrue from the increased carbon-free renewable 
production) or use the allowances to increase generation from fossil fuels. Hence emissions 
remain the same. As member states with relatively ambitious RES-E targets do not enjoy CO2 
benefits, inequality in the burden of RES-E stimulation among member states may trigger 
political opposition within those states where this burden is perceived to be most onerous. This 
is an important challenge facing the EU.
4 
6.2.6  Interactions with other environmental policies 
Renewable electricity stimulation may interact significantly with other environmental 
Community policies. For example, in Austria and Italy – where hydro power is the most 
important source available for generation of renewable electricity – implementation of the 
Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) is limiting the use of available hydro power potential 
to a considerable degree.
5 This raises the issue of coherence and better coordination among 
Community initiatives. 
                                                           
4 As allowances will be traded on the ETS market, affected installations will be facing an opportunity cost 
of the additional CO2 they emit. Power prices are expected to increase as a result of this opportunity cost. 
The expected higher prices of electricity will benefit investments in RES-E production. It is generally 
acknowledged, however, that the present level and expected future prices of allowances will not make the 
need for supporting RES-E production redundant. Expansion of RES-E production will of course reduce 
emissions from the power sector – ceteris paribus – compared with a situation without the increase in 
RES-E production. The effect would be one of two possibilities: the power sector could obtain a surplus 
of allowances owing to RES-E production and they will sell this on the ETS market; or, they will 
purchase fewer allowances on the market. In either situation, the price of allowances will be reduced and 
any surplus from the power sector would be absorbed by purchase from other ETS sectors. Hence, the 
level of emissions from all installations under the ETS sector will not be affected by an increase in CO2-
free RES-E production. 
5 See the presentation by Bussi (2005). 46 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
 
6.2.7  The international dimension 
From the perspective of both enhancing the security of energy supply and promoting sustainable 
development, the EU has embarked on constructive engagement with neighbouring countries. 
Therefore, concerning renewable electricity the following should be given due consideration. 
Neighbouring countries that are willing to fully transpose the Renewables Directive onto their 
respective national legislation including the adoption of indicative targets to be agreed upon 
with the European Commission should be allowed to share not only its obligations but also its 
benefits. For example, neighbouring countries with large endowments of RES-E (hydro, wind 
and sun) should be allowed to transfer RE-GOs to EU member states for disclosure applications. 
This action could provide additional revenue streams for, and facilitate financing of, renewable-
electricity generating projects in these countries. This policy may apply to EEA countries (such 
as Norway) and to Switzerland (through its bilateral agreements with the EU), yet in the 
medium term equally well to countries that are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy area. 
6.2.8 Recommended  timeframe for coordinated actions 
The following tentative timeframe for coordinated action at the EU level is recommended for 
further consideration (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Timeframe for action 
Action  Timing of introduction 
  Before 2007  Before 2010  After 2015 
Analysis of best practises of support schemes*  √    
Harmonisation of support mechanisms   
a) Total level of support  √    
b) Support schemes     √ **   
c) EU framework    √   
Removing mandatory support       √ 
Preparation of harmonised RE-GO schemes  √    
Introduction of harmonised RE-GO/GO schemes    √   
Grid integration    
a) Grid extension planning  √    
b) Coordination and information sharing among 
regulators and TSOs  
√    
c) Harmonisation of member state grid access codes 
and standards for network equipment 
  √   
d) RES-E priority dispatch re-examination     √   
Authorisation procedures  
a) Promotion of streamlining of  authorisation 
procedures based on best practice 
√    
b) Promotion of regional one-stop authorisation   √    
* This action assumes agreed data collection. 
** Given a seven-year transition period, the implementation of harmonisation decisions will come fully into 
operation by 2014 at the earliest and 2016 at the latest.  
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Annex A. Support for CHP and Distributed Generation 
in Relation to RES-E Stimulation 
CHP support 
The CHP Directive (2004/8/EC) is meant to provide a supportive legislative framework for high 
efficiency co-generation of (useful) heat and power (CHP). This Directive leaves the 
specification of support mechanisms in favour of CHP up to the member states. But it mandates 
the streamlining of authorisation procedures and a level playing field regarding the access of 
CHP and other generators to the electricity grid. 
No clear guidance is given in the CHP Directive on the compatibility of combining support for 
renewable electricity sources (RES-E) with CHP support measures, notably in the case of 
biomass-based CHP. The guidelines on state support for environmental protection appear to 
forbid, within a context of ‘non-cumulation of aid’, support for RES-E electricity in excess of 
RES-E costs. Yet CHP generators in several member states complain that their heat production 
is not usually assisted by prevailing support frameworks. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) (Directive 2003/87/EC) would even introduce negative biases regarding the economics of 
new CHP plants. Hence, in the case of several potential subsidy sources there seems room for 
the design of national CHP support schemes that avoid non-cumulation clauses by relating one 
such source to the heat output as opposed to the electricity output of CHP plants. 
Distributed generation 
Grid access plays a major role in the discussion of distributed generation (DG). A large 
deployment of DG cannot be efficient or cost-effective without an adequate reorganisation of 
the distribution sector. Basically, the system has to switch from a passive configuration of 
unidirectional flows (from centralised generation to end customers) to an active configuration, 
where electricity is injected and traded in the low voltage grid. 
The key point is that the role of the DSO (distribution system operator) would have to evolve in 
order to provide the adequate connectivity to the network. Given that an active system would 
require considerable investments in terms of infrastructure, R&D and personnel training, 
investments would require the support of an adequate regulatory framework that would provide 
incentives for actions aiming at integrating DG. 
Even if an increase in DG resulted in some sort of decentralisation of the system functions, in 
order to properly reach the objectives there is still the need to have common guidelines, since 
the required level of coordination is possibly higher than in traditional systems.
1 
Other conditions for optimisation are the variations in costs according to the location and load 
profile of end customers. This implies that access costs should be differentiated in order to 
capture the benefits/costs accrued to the system. The main messages related to support for DG 
are: 
•  With regard to grid impact, a large deployment of DG requires a reorganisation of the 
distribution sector in both technical and economic terms. This would require a medium- to 
long-term investment policy on infrastructures.  
•  Concerning EU policy, there are large economies of scale to be achieved through common 
standards (regulatory/economic and technical).  
                                                           
1 The number of actors involved in the market increases with the introduction of DG. 52 | JANSEN, GIALOGLOU & EGENHOFER 
 
•  DG users should operate in a highly regulated environment – decentralisation does not 
imply anarchy. Only through coordination is it possible to achieve efficiency in operations 
and investments. 
•  DG is profitable only for customers with specific grid locations and/or load profiles. DG 
should not be installed as a general solution, but only for customers having certain 
favourable characteristics. 
DG has a number of specific advantages, which include: 
•  transmission and distribution investment deferrals, which may actually lead to an increased 
focus on the demand side rather than on additional construction of high voltage lines; 
•  reduction of losses – generating the electricity close to the end-user reduces the electricity 
losses associated with the power transport; 
•  a variant for power reliability, reducing the number of interruptions for the customers 
owning DG units; 
•  savings on electricity and heating bills; 
•  increased power quality – by controlling the power output and current waveform of 
distributed energy resource (DER) units, improved power quality and reliability can be 
achieved for some customers; and 
•  generation capacity deferral – DG allows the avoidance of lumpy investments, reducing the 
risk of error in forecasting long-term load growth. | 53 
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